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INTRODUCTION
More than a million deaths each year are attributed to coronary
heart disease and the incidence is steadily increasing. A number of
medical researchers have pointed to the psychological state of
depression as a precursor to this, as well as many other forms of
major illnesses. For example, the work of Greene (e.g., Greene,
Goldstein, & Moss. 1972), suggests that sudden death due to coronary
disease occurs in men who have been depressed for a week up to several
months prior to death. Since there are major parallels between be-
haviors that define helplessness and symptoms of depression (Seligman,
1975), it is not unreasonable to assume that the state of helplessness
may be an antecedent of coronary disease (Krantz, Glass, & Snyder,
1974) . If helplessness figures generally in the etiology of somatic
and psychic disease, it seems obvious that we should ask what set
of factors interact with this state or predispose an individual toward
cardiovascular impairment rather than some other disorder (e.g., cancer)
The work of Rosenman and Friedman (Rosenman, Friedman, Strauss,
Wurm, Kositchek, Hahn, & Werthessen, 1964; Rosenman, Friedman, Strauss,
Wurm, Jenkins, & Messinger, 1966) offer a partial answer to this ques-
tion with their research on the "coronary-prone behavior pattern"
called Type A. The Type A pattern is characterized by competitive
achievement-striving, a sense of time urgency, hostility, hard-driving-
ness, and impatience, all of which can be elevated and observed pri-
marily in the presence of appropriate environmental circumstances
(Friedman & Rosenman, 1974; Friedman, 1969). Persons mainfesting the
behavior pattern, as determined by a standardized interview, are
designated Type A; those who exhibit the pattern to a lesser degree
are called Type B. Thus, this overt behavior pattern is a bipolar
continuum, rather than a strict typology. Glass (1977) suggests the
Type A behavior pattern is a response style that may mediate the
relationship between helplessness and coronary disease. Research
(Glass, 1977) indicates that extended experience with salient uncon-
trollable stress may result in enhanced vulnerability to helplessness
among Type A's. It may be, therefore, that the specific interaction
of Pattern A and helplessness-inducing life events is prodromal to
clinical coronary heart disease.
The research to be reviewed below is presented in two parts.
First, the Type A behavior pattern is explored in detail, including
the methods for its measurement, its relationship to coronary disease,
the effects of uncontrollable events on Pattern A, and various inter-
pretations of the experimental findings are discussed. The second
part of the literature review deals with the learned helplessness model,
both the original and reformulated accounts. The major focus of this
study is to analyze from the point of view of the subject, the various
ways in which Type A and Type B college students might experience uncon-
trollable events, specifically, failure on a cognitive task. As shown
in the literature review, it is unclear as to what the critical experi-
mental variables and their manner of operation are as they interact with
the Type A behavior pattern upon exposure to uncontrollable events.
Therefore, this study explores and discusses this interaction.
Measurement of Pattern A
There are two primary methods for the measurement of the coronary-
prone behavior pattern: (1) a standardized stress interview developed
by Friedman and Rosenman (e.g., see Rosenman et al. , 1964); and (2)
an objective self-administered questionnaire developed by Jenkins
(Jenkins, Rosenman, & Friedman, 1967). In the interview, subjects
are asked a series of questions about their characteristic competi-
tiveness, aggression, and hostility. Both the content and overt
behavioral style (e.g., speech stylistics) of the subject's responses
are important to final assessment of the behavior pattern. Subjects
are classified as: fully developed A's (Al) ; incompletely developed
A's (A2) ; incompletely developed B's (B3) ; and fully developed B's
(B4). In addition, there is an intermediate pattern called Type X,
which is found in persons who exhibit some of the characteristics of
both the Type A and Type B. Estimates indicate that about 10% of the
population fall in the X category (Friedman & Rosenman, 1974). The
stress interview requires trained judges, is time consuming and is,
like every interview technique, not independent of the subject and
interviewer interaction. Jenkins, Rosenman, and Friedman (1968) re-
port that two trained judges rated the behavior pattern interviews
the same way in 84% of 75 cases drawn from a larger sample of over
3000 men. The judgment was dichotomous, that is, either A or 3.
As for test-retest reliability, Jenkins et_ al . (1968) have shewn that
of 1064 adult male subjects, 30% were placed in the same A-B category
on the basis of interviews conducted 12-20 months apart.
The second assessment technique is the self-administered question-
naire known as the JAS, that is, the Jenkins Activity Survey for
Health Prediction (Jenkins e_t_ al_ . , 1967). This scale was developed
by evaluating the ability of each of a large number of potentially
relevant questions to predict the interview assessment. The items
were then weighted according to their predictive validity and combined
to form the JAS, which has been shown to agree with the dichotomous
interview assessment 73% of the time, and with the assessment of
extreme A's and B's 90% of the time (Jenkins, Zyzanski, it Rosenman,
1971) . The test-retest reliability of the JAS over a one year period
was .66 (Jenkins et al. , 1971).
Scoring of the JAS items is based on a series of optimal weights
derived from discriminant function equations generated from scores
of adult subjects used in a prospective study designed to establish the
predictive validity of the structured interview (Jenkins, Rosenman, &
Zyzanski, 1974). In addition to the overall A-B score, the JAS can be
scored for three factor analytically derived scales, which have been
named Speed and Impatience (S), Hard-Driving (H) , and Job Involvement
(J) (Jenkins, Zyzanski, & Rosenman, 1971). The factor scores repre-
sent the three qualitatively different sets of overt behavior char-
acteristics which typify the Type A pattern.
Typical questions from the JAS are:
1. "How would your wife (or closest friend) rate you?"; Pattern A
responses are "Definitely hard-driving and competitive" and "Probably
hard-driving and competitive", and B responses are "Probably relaxed
and easy going" and "Definitely relaxed and easy going".
2. "How would your spouse (or best friend) rate your general level
of activity?"; an A response is "Too active, needs to slow down",
and B responses are "Too slow, should be more active" and "About
average, is busy much of the time".
A modified, student version of the JAS was designed for young
men and women attending college. This was necessary because administra-
tion of the intact JAS to such a population is not entirely appropriate,
The test was, after all, designed for working male adults. A dis-
cussion of the modification, its scoring, and reliability can be
found in Glass (1977, Appendix A). Suffice it to note here that the
A-B scale of the student JAS contains 21 items, just as in the original
JAS. Note, also, that with one exception, each item is virtually
identical to the corresponding item in the adult version.
Construct Validity of Pattern A
Glass (1977) and his associates have conducted a series of ex-
periments documenting that Type A's (as measured by the JAS) indeed
behave in a competitive, aggressive, and impatient fashion. One such
Pattern A component, excessive achievement striving, has been demon-
strated by Burnam, Pennebaker, and Glass (1975). They reported that
Type A's worked on a seemingly important task at near maximum capacity,
irrespective of the presence or absence of a time deadline. Type 3's,
in contrast, exerted equivalent effort only when the task had an ex-
plicit deadline. The hard-driving character of the Type A individual
is also manifest in a tendency to suppress subjective fatigue while
exercising, thus persisting at a task despite veridical feelings of
exhaustion (Carver, Coleman, & Glass, 1976). Type A individuals also
fail to report a variety of other physical symptoms of illness when
performing a stressful task. (Weidner & Matthews, 1978).
Aggressiveness and hostility are believed to constitute another
major component of the Type A behavior pattern. Suggestive evidence
in this regard comes from two sources. In an experiment in which
cooperative task, performance was deliberately slowed down by the sub-
ject's partner (a confederate), more signs of impatience and irritation
on the part of the subject were systematically observed among Type
A's than among Type B's (Glass, Snyder, & Hollis, 1974, Exp. 2). In
a more recent study by Carver and Glass (1978) subjects were exposed
to a confederate who did or did not threaten their sense of competence
and mastery. There were three treatment conditions in this experiment:
(1) harrassment while working on a frustrating task, (2) no harrassment
while working on a frustrating task, and (3) no harrassment and no
task to perform. An opportunity was then given to shock the confederate
under the guise of a learning experiment. Type A's were significantly
more aggressive when exposed to the harrassment treatment than the
control condition, but Type B's were not. More importantly, this study
showed that the full harrassment procedure was not necessary to produce
heightened aggression among the Type A's. The simple frustration of
being confronted with a task whose challenge could not be met yielded
nearly as much aggression among Type A individuals as did the full
harrassment procedure. In contrast, the frustration manipulation had
no such effect among Type B's. The types did not differ in the amount
of shock delivered to the confederate in the no harrassment-no task
control condition.
A third component of Pattern A, time urgency, has also been
elicited in several studies. For example, Type A' s performed more
poorly than their Type B counterparts on a task requiring a low rate
of responding for reinforcement (DRL) because they responded too
quickly to obtain a sequence of monetary rewards (Glass, Snyder, &
Hollis, 1974, Exp. 1). The time urgency component has also been
found to result in perceptual distortion with Type A' s judging the
lapse of one minute more quickly than Type B's (Burnam e_t al_. , 1975).
The Association of Pattern A with Coronarv Disease
There are two major manifestations of clinical coronary heart
disease: (1) angina pectoris, and (2) myocardial infarction. The
latter is the disorder commonly called heart attack. A myocardial
infarction involves necrosis (death) of heart tissue caused by in-
sufficient oxygen supply over a relatively long period of time. In
many cases, though not all, the infarction is a result of a clot of
thrombus forming in a coronary artery. The term angina pectoris
designates a disorder involving a type of chest pain which arises
when the heart muscle experiences anoxia because of an inadequate
blood supply occasioned by occlusion of one or more of the coronary
arteries (Friedberg, 1966). Coronary artery disease (CAD), or
atherosclerosis, is a symptomless disorder characterized by thicken-
ing of the coronary arteries.
Epidemiological research has demonstrated both prospectively and
retrospectively that knowledge of the interview assessment of the
Type A pattern significantly increases prediction of the major mani-
festations of coronary heart disease, independent of traditional risk
8factors such as cigarette smoking, serum cholesterol, and hypertension
(Rosenman, Brand, Jenkins, Friedman, Strauss, ^ Wurm, 1975; Brand,
Rosenman, Stoltz, & Friedman, 1976; Shekelle, Schoenberger , & Stamler,
1976; Jenkins, 1976). In two retrospective studies with men (Fried-
man & Rosenman, 1959) and women (Rosenman & Friedman, 1961), the
Type A pattern was shown to be associated with a higher prevalence of
both the risk factors and the symptoms of coronary heart disease than
was the Type B pattern. Due to the retrospective and correlational
nature of these studies, it was not possible to conclude that Pattern
A precipitated the onset of coronary heart disease, but only that it
was associated with it.
To overcome some of these limitations, a large scale prospective
study conducted by the Western Collaborative Group (WCGS) was begun
in 1960 (Rosenman, Friedman, Strauss, Wurm, Kositchek, Hahn, & Wert-
hessen, 1964). On the basis of the interview assessment, 3400 men
with no history or symptoms of heart disease were classified as Type
A's or Type B's. The responsibility for diagnostic judgments of heart
disease was undertaken by two cardiologists, both of whom worked inde-
pendently of the study and had no knowledge of the behavior pattern
classifications. In the 2*5 and 4% year follow-up studies (Rosenman,
Friedman, Strauss, Wurm, Jenkins, & Messinger, 1966; Rosenman, Fried-
man, Strauss, Jenkins, Zyzanski, & Wurm, 1970), it was found that
healthy men judged to possess Pattern A at intake had between 1.7 and
6 times the rate of disease of men judged to be Pattern B. Further-
more, the association of Pattern A with CHD was maintained even after
partialing out the effects of traditional risk factors on which Type
A's and Type B's differed. Upon the conclusion of the study, the
results indicated that men judged at intake to be Type A had more than
twice the rate of new CHD during 8h years as men originally judged
to possess Pattern B behavior (Rosenman, Brand, Jenkins, Friedman,
Strauss, & Wurm, 1975). These results also showed that Type A sub-
jects with CHD were 5 times more likely to have a second myocardial
infarction than were Type B subjects with CHD.
Other studies indicate that Pattern A, as measured by the inter-
view, is not only related to the actual occurrence of clinical CHD,
but is also associated with the coronary artery disease process which
culminates in myocardial infarction or angina. Data derived from
autopsies and coronary angiography have shown that the atherosclerotic
process (thickening of the coronary arteries) is more fully developed
in Type A's relative to Type B's (Blumenthal, Williams, Kong, Thompson,
Jenkins, & Rosenman, in press; Friedman, Rosenman, Strauss, Wurm, &
Kositchek, 1968).
Two recent studies (Jenkins, Zyzanski, Rosenman, & Cleveland,
1971; Kenigsberg, Zyzanski, Jenkins, Wardwell, & Licciardello , 1974)
have demonstrated that the JAS , the second technique, can also dis-
tinguish between coronary and noncoronary populations on a retro-
spective basis. The JAS has also successfully predicted the occur-
rence of coronary disease in an initially healthy population over a
four year period (Jenkins, Rosenman, & Zyzanski, 1974). Among extreme
Type A's, the annual incidence of coronary heart disease was 15 per
1000, while among extreme Type B's the incidence was only 8 per 1000.
More recently, Zyzanski, Jenkins, Ryan, Flessas, and Everist (1976)
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have shown a striking relationship between Pattern A and the athero-
sclerotic process. Type A's, as measured by the JAS, showed a greater
magnitude of occlusion of the coronary arteries than did Type B's.
A mere recent study using the A-B scale score of the JAS found that
it was the strongest single predictor of recurrent CHD among a set
of available variables including serum cholesterol and number of
cigarettes smoked daily (Jenkins, Zyzanski, & Rosenman, 1976). Glass
and his associates (1977) have also found that Pattern A characteristics
in college students, as measured by the JAS, are also associated with
factors that place an individual at high risk for CHD (e.g., serum
cholesterol, triglyceride levels, serum uric acid, and lipalbumin levels)
Pattern A and Uncontrollable Stress
The descriptive elements of the Type A pattern suggest someone
who is continually striving to avoid loss of control over his environ-
ment (Glass, 1977). In contrast to B's, Type A's work hard, suppress
fatigue, and show little tolerance for being interrupted and slowed
down, perhaps in the interest of achieving control over environmental
demands and requirements. These demands are stressful, for the possi-
bility of failure and loss of esteem are evident. The Type A pattern
is conceptualized as a coping response style aimed at asserting and
maintaining control over potentially uncontrollable situations (Glass,
Snyder, & Hollis, 1974). Whereas, Type A's appear to be engaged in a
continual struggle for mastery over their social and physical environ-
ments, Type B's are relatively free of such concerns.
The evidence to be presented below suggests that the behavioral
style of Type A's indeed reflect a greater reactivity to signs of
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uncontrollability . However, this response style of A's to uncontrol-
lability must be qualified to take into account the prominence or
salience of the cues signifying the uncontrollable nature of the
stressor. As used in the context of this paper, cue salience refers
broadly to those stimulus or stimulus-field properties which compel
or attract a subject's attention. Taken at a very basic level, this
concept could be defined in terms of the physical intensity of the
stimulus, but other properties such as novelty, ui predictability
,
and the relationship to other elements in the stimulus-field obviously
play an important role in compelling attention. For example, a salient
cue signaling uncontrollability would be one which attracts the sub-
ject's attention, as, for example, loud rather than soft inescapable
noise. Properties of the situation including instructional set and
environmental cues also lead to differential salience.
Initial Reactions to Uncontrollability
Recent evidence has been offered suggesting that Type A's are
more reactive to salient initial indications of uncontrollability
than Type B's. This notion was tested in a series of experiments
in which perceptions of control were manipulated (Glass, 1977). In
one such study, the initial efforts of Type A's to reassert control
were measured by the response rate of Type A's and 3's earning points
on either a VR/5 or FR/5 schedule of reinforcement (Glass, 1977,
Chapter 9). Subjects depressed a switch in order to earn points which
were defined as worth 1 cent apiece. Half of the cases were randomly
assigned to an FR/5 training schedule (that is, a controllable condition).
whereas the other half were assigned to a VR/5 schedule (an uncontrollable
condition). Within each of these treatments, half of the subjects
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experienced the partial reinforcement procedure under High Salience
conditions; that is, the response apparatus was illuminated in an
otherwise darkened chamber, and a counter and bright signal light
were activated whenever the subject earned a point. The remaining
half of the cases in both VR/5 and FR/5 worked in a well-lit chamber,
where there was no visible counter and the only indication of rein-
forcement was activation of a dim light whenever a point was earned.
This was the Moderate Salience treatment. The number of switch de-
pressions within the total period constituted the major dependent
measure. Subjects perceived less control over earning points in the
VR/5 schedule than in the FR/5 schedule, thereby confirming the
effectiveness of the reinforcement manipulation in inducing differ-
ential perceptions of control. The results also indicated that
in the High Salience VR/5 condition, A's had a higher response rate
than their Type B counterparts. The reverse was true in Moderate
Salience. These findings suggest that Type A's make more vigorous
efforts to control when they are initially threatened by a salient
loss of control. In contrast, if the uncontrollability cues are of
moderate salience, Type B's make more vigorous efforts to reassert
control than Type A's. This pattern of findings has been replicated
by Matthews (Note 1) on male adults and children.
Prolonged Exposure to Uncontrollabilitv
Enhanced performance reflects an attempt to assert and maintain
control after its loss has been threatened. However, enhanced re-
sponding must prove ineffective in the long run, for extended exposure
to uncontrollable stress eventually leads to the perception that a
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noncontingency exists between responses and outcomes. The Type A
individual may then be expected to give up efforts at control on a
subsequent task, and show what has been called learned helplessness
(see Glass, 1977). While Type B's will also experience helplessness
under these circumstances, nevertheless, it is the A's who should
exhibit little efforts to control presumably because of their ten-
dency to experience loss of control as more threatening (Glass, 1977).
Research has been conducted which provides some support for this
notion provided that the uncontrollable event is highly salient.
Krantz, Glass, and Snyder (1974) found that Type A subjects showed
depressed response initiation after exposure to uncontrollable 108 dBA
noise (High Salience) relative to their escape behavior following con-
trollable noise of comparable intensity. With a 7S dBA uncontrollable
noise (Moderate Salience) A's did not give up responding. Type B
subjects, by contrast, showed learned helplessness after uncontrollable
noise of moderate intensity.
In a second learned helplessness experiment (Glass, 1977, Chapter
8, Exp. 2), cue salience was varied by manipulating the subject's
degree of awareness of his success or failure on a series of cognitive
tasks. When cues were of high salience, Type A's showed greater in-
terference with subsequent learning after uncontrollable (insoluble)
than controllable (soluble) pretreatment . When cues were of moderate
salience, Type A's performed at about the same level in the test phase,
whether pretreatment was controllable or uncontrollable. The pattern
of response was the opposite for Type B subjects, with learned help-
lessness tending to occur only after pretreatment with uncontrollable
cues of moderate salience. It would appear, therefore, that learned
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helplessness occurs in A's after extended exposure to uncontrollabillty
in a subset of uncontrollable events. A similar sequence applies to
Type B's if the salience measure is of moderate as compared to high
intensity.
The experimental data pertaining to this line of thought sug-
gests a complex pattern of response. It appears that Type A's show
greater learned helplessness than B's under high salience (e.g.,
108-decibel inescapable noise) but not under moderate salience (e.g.,
78-decibel inescapable noise) . Various interpretations have been
offered to explain this complex pattern of responses.
Achievement Motivation or Pattern A?
One such interpretation argues that random reinforcement and ex-
posure to inescapable noise are more parsimoniously treated as mani-
pulations of failure even though they demonstrably effect feelings of
control. It could be argued that the behavior of Pattern A is explicable
in terms of the dual constructs of need-for-achievement (n Ach) and
f ear-of-failure (_f fai) . In this regard, investigators (Atkinson,
1957; Weiner, 1972) have developed theoretical models which propose
that success depresses the performance of individuals high in resultant
achievement motivation (i.e., high _n Ach and low f_ fai), while failure
increases their achievement strivings. A reverse set of predictions
are made for individuals low in resultant achievement motivation.
However, two recent studies (see Glass, 1977) reveal low correlations
(.15 and .17, respectively) between the student JAS and a measure of
need-for-achievement (Edwards, 1957). Both correlations are signifi-
cant Cp_ < -05) but the samples were large (Ms = 275 and 294, respectively)
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and the magnitude of these coefficients are quite small. A measure
of f ear-of-failure (Mandler a Sarason, 1952) correlated negligibly
with JAS scores (-.02). These results suggest that Pattern A is not
simply an alternative label for high need-for-achievement and low
fear-of-failure
.
Recently, Matthews and Saal (in press) found that in a sample
of male college students, Pattern A as measured by either the inter-
view or the JAS was not related to achievement, power, or affiliation
motives, in spite of their descriptive resemblance to the Type A
pattern. However, when both need to achieve and need to avoid failure
were considered simultaneously, as suggested by achievement motiva-
tion theory (Atkinson & Feather, 1966), an interesting pattern of
findings emerges. Those with the highest JAS Type A scores were indi-
viduals high on need to achieve and low on need to avoid failure. Men
with this particular combination of characteristics choose moderately
challenging tasks, persist longer on them, and are upwardly mobile
(Atkinson & Feather, 1966), all behaviors consistent with the chronic
achievement-striving characteristic of Type A's. However, those with
the highest interview scores were not those high on need to achieve
and low on need to avoid failure. So we conclude that the Type A's
efforts to control cannot be explained by the achievement motivation
construct
.
Cognitive-motivational interpretation
Since Type A individuals are presumably more concerned than their
Type B counterparts about maintaining environmental control, it may
be expected that A's would distort cues signifying lack of control
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(Glass, 1977). Indeed, when uncontrollability cues do not compel
attention, for example, in the case of soft inescapable noise, Type
A's should find it relatively easy to minimize the fact that they are
unable to control the stimulation. Under these conditions, A's may
exert less efforts at achieving control than B's, hence fail to show
subsequent helplessness. This may occur because the motive to exert
control is not sufficient enough to bring about the enhanced efforts
to locate control-relevant cues. On the other hand, if lack of control
is a salient feature of their environment, for example, in the case of
loud inescapable noise, A's should experience difficulty in ignoring
its presence and thus exert enhanced efforts at locating control-
relevant cues. These efforts will eventually result in a stronger
certainty that nothing can be done about terminating the noise. Such
awareness of uncontrollability should lead to a decrement in efforts
at control, that is, learned helplessness.
There are some difficulties with this interpretation however. One
difficulty is the absence of evidence indicating that Type A's exper-
ience uncontrollable stimuli of moderate salience as less uncontrollable
than B's. While one learned helplessness experiment (Krantz et al.
,
1974) produced self-ratings of control tending to support this notion
of denial, a second study (Glass, 1977, Chapter 8, Exp. 2) was unequi-
vocal in its failure to replicate this pattern. However, it may be that
lack of control can be freely admitted on a questionnaire, yet explained
away by the subject in terms of attributions designed to enhance his
sense of mastery.
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It was previously noted in the partial-reinforcement study (Glass,
1977, Chapter 9) that initial level of responding was greater among
Moderate Salience B's than Moderate Salience A's. Though Glass is
at a loss to explain these results, he draws upon data from another
study (Glass, 1977, pp. 48-49) showing that B's have a lower threshold
than A's for responding to aversive events. This experiment provides
some documentation for this assertion, since it indicated that B's
responded sooner than A's to an unwanted sound stimulation. Assuming,
then, that Type B's have a lower general response threshold, this
might explain their specific reaction to uncontrollability cues of
moderate salience in terms of the fact that such cases exceed their
threshold for response. It follows from this hypothesis that B's
should show greater learned helplessness after extended experience
with non-prominent (moderately salient) stimulation, presumably be-
cause they have more fully explored the possibility of a response-
reinforcement contingency and concluded that they do not, in fact,
have control over the situation. The trouble with this line of reason-
ing is that it leaves us without a satisfactory explanation for the
low initial responsivity of B's when the uncontrollable stimuli are
of high salience. Since the threshold for B's was presumably reached
in moderate salience, the decrement in responsivity in high salience
is puzzling.
Concerning the results of Glass's (1977) research, the observed
enhanced responsivity of A's may be a style of response rather than
the result of perceptual effects, or a combination of both. By and
large, Glass and his colleagues have been unable to detect differences
between A's and B's in the way they assess experimental situations.
18
The only significant exceptions are the control-rating data reported
in one study (Glass, 1977), plus occasional differences beween A's
and B's in felt frustration. It is, of course, entirely possible
that they have failed to sample a number of the more relevant percep-
tual dimensions. For example, it was noted (Glass, 1977, Chapter 7)
that Moderate Salience A's might be denying lack of control through
some unmeasured attributional process, and there may still be other
differences in how experimental procedures were perceived by their
subjects.
Attentional interpretation
Recently, Matthews and Brunson (in press) demonstrated that Type
A's have a differential responding style, which is inferred to be
indicative of an attentional difference between Type A's and B's.
In a dual-task situation, Type A's focused, or concentrated, their
attention on the primary task (a modif ied-version of the Stroop Color
Word test) and gave minimal attention to a secondary task (key-pressing
to a light). Type B's, on the other hand, appeared to split their
attention between the primary and secondary tasks. In a second experi-
ment of this study, they found that Type A's and B's in a Control (No
Noise) condition performed in a similar manner on the Stroop. Their
results suggest that Type A's concentrate their attention on salient
environmental events, thus appearing hyperalert but unable to report
extraneous (peripheral) cues. These results may provide an interpreta-
tion of Type A's reactions to the salience of uncontrollable events.
That is, Type A's, may attend to the most salient aspects of their
environment and do not respond to any event controllable or uncontrollable
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unless it is very compelling of attention. This attentional inter-
pretation of the salience findings can explain Type A's behavior.
It does not explain why Type B's do not give up following highly
salient uncontrollable events, given that they do give up following
moderately salient ones.
Arousal interpretation
Making the assumption that A's may be more aroused than B's
could account for various results of Type A pattern research. A
simple arousal concept could probably account for a good deal of the
data showing that A's work near maximum capacity, deny subjective
feelings of fatigue and exhibit exaggerated striving towards success
(Carver, Coleman, & Glass, 1976; Glass, 1977; Weidner & Matthews,
1978; Snyder & Glass, Note 3). Some of the time urgency experiments
are explicable on the assumption that more aroused Type A's deviate
from the optimal level of activation necessary for efficient task
performance. Given a complex reaction time task, for example, aroused
subjects may be expected to do more poorly than less aroused subjects
(cf. Easterbrook, 1959; Kahneman, 1973). Elevated levels of arousal
can also explain the aggression data (Glass, 1977; Carver & Glass,
1978), providing that we think of activation as potentiating the impact
of aggressive cues (cf. Berkowitz, 1967).
The general notion of activation-arousal has greater difficulty
in accounting for the differential reactivity of A's relative to B's
after brief and extended exposure to salient uncontrollable stressors.
The test-phase tasks used in Glass's (1977) research (for example,
choice reaction time or anagrams) were relatively complex, and therefore
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it might be expected that more aroused, Inescapable A's would do more
poorly compared to their less aroused Type B counterparts. Such
an effect did, in fact, occur after extended uncontrollable pretreat-
ment, where the level of stressful stimulation was high (Glass, 1977,
Chapter 7). In contrast, such an effect did not occur when extended
pretreatment stimulation was of moderate intensity, or when pretreat-
ment was brief and stimulation was of high intensity.
In addition, Glass (1977) has stated that in several of his ex-
periments that there was no detection of differences in arousal re-
actions of Type A's and B's, thus this data did not indicate the
viability of an arousal approach to the helplessness effects. Glass
has suggested that the possibility exists that electro-physiological
measurements (e.g., heart-rate, finger vasoconstriction, and GSR)
are insensitive to A-B differences in autonomic reactions to uncon-
trollable stress. It is also possible that the conditions under
which their physiological readings were taken were not appropriate for
detecting A-B differences. Moreover, activation or arousal is not a
unitary concept; and states of behavioral, autonomic, electro-cortical,
and biochemical arousal are often dissociated from one another (Lacey,
1967).
As Glass (1977) points out, there is an obvious problem for an
arousal interpretation of his results; that is, there is an inability
to determine how uncontrollable stimulation, whether high or moderate,
might affect the level of arousal of Type A and Type B subjects. It
would thus appear that activation-arousal does not provide a coherent
and parsimonious explanation for the range of effects observed in his
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research. However, there is a possibility that a more sophisticated
analysis of the arousal concept, one which permits specification of
the subject's location on the arousal continuum, may yet prove to be
an accurate interpretation of Pattern A behavior. Such a conclusion
must await theoretical and empirical work.
Expectational interpretation
A further possibility is that Type A's have higher expectations
of control than Type B's. Elevated expectancies could produce an
increase in motivation to exercise control. There is, in fact, evi-
dence that when lack of control (for example, failure) occurs in a
context of expectations of control (success), performance suffers more
than when the expectations of control are lower (e.g., Douglas &
Anisman, 1975). Compared to B's, then, the high control expectancies
of A's might lead them to exert greater efforts when confronted by a
stressor which threatens their sense of mastery. It is not immediately
obvious, however, why expectancies would have this effect only with
cues of uncontrollability that are high in salience.
There are, moreover, some difficulties with at least one of the
basic assumptions underlying an expectational hypothesis. It has
been assumed that (1) the incentive to assert control is related Co
expectations that one's controlling behavior will be successful and,
(2) Type A's have higher expectations of control than Type B's. The
first assumption may very well be correct. There is research to sug-
gest that a relationship exists between expectations and efforts at
control (Wortman & Brehm, 1975; Thornton S Jacobs, 1972). Still other
studies suggest that the manipulation of control expectancies can
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both potentiate and alleviate performance degradations due to pro-
longed exposure to uncontrollable stressors (e.g., Dweck, 1975;
Krantz et al
.
, 1974; Exp. Ill; Thornton & Powell, 1971). Moreover,
at least one theoretical formulation emphasizes the role of expecta-
tions in determining reactions to uncontrollable events (Wortman &
Brehm, 1975). This theory proposes that the greater one's expecta-
tions of control, the greater will be the motivation to assert control
when confronted by evidence of uncontrollability . Similar to Glass's
(1977) formulation, the theory suggests that as uncontrollable stimu-
lation continues, and the futility of responding is realized, expecta-
tions of control along with the motivation to control are lowered
and learned helplessness ensues.
As for the second assumption, there is some evidence (Glass,
Snyder, & Hollis, 1974) for the hypothesis that A's have higher ex-
pectations of control than B's, comes from a weak, though significant
correlation between Type A scores on the JAS and "internal" scores
on Rotter's I-E scale (r = .17, df = 271, £ < .01). In addition,
Type A's report themselves to be more confident, dominant, and socially
competent than do Type B's as measured by three scales of the Texas
Social Behavior Inventory (see Glass, 1977, Appendix C) . The correla-
tions with the JAS were .24, .40, and .17 (p_s < .01), respectively.
These findings reflect that A's expect to be successful in their social
and physical environments and that they claim to act upon these beliefs.
These coefficients are statistically significant primarily because of the
large number of cases on which they are based, but the magnitude of the
relationship is obviously too small to warrant serious consideration.
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Only one study has been cited that dealt with the expectational
hypothesis with Type A's and B's (Hollis , 1975, Note 4). Expectations
of success or failure on a series of cognitive tasks (adapted from
Roth & Kubal , 19 75) were either raised, lowered, or left untreated
by means of instructional manipulations. Type A, relative to Type E,
subjects exerted less effort over time to solve a series of insoluble
puzzles. Since a similar pattern of results occurred for the High as
opposed to the Low Expectation condition, tentative support was ob-
tained for the notion that expectations of control mediate greater sus-
ceptibility to the effects of uncontrollability . While subjects in
the High Expectation treatment had reliably greater expectancies of
success than did those in the Low Expectation treatment, the results
also showed that A's in the No Expectation treatment reported lower
expectations than their Type B counterparts. There was an A-B main
effect, such that B's in all three conditions anticipated more success
than A's. These results clearly do not support the notion that A's
have higher expectancies of control than B's. Other data from Hollis
(1975, Note 4) study failed to give credence to the notion that general-
ized expectations of control mediate initial hyper-responsiveness of
A's in high salience.
An obvious question emerges from the research thus far reported:
Why do A's and B's show differential responsivity to uncontrollability
cues of high and moderate salience? Several interpretations of the
experimental results have been offered; and, yet, none of them can
clearly explain this complex pattern of behavior. All of the inter-
pretations suggested in the previous section extend our knowledge of
24
the Type A behavior pattern, but leave us without a perspicuous un-
derstanding of Type As' responses to uncontrollable events. Until
we understand these findings, we cannot assert that A's are more
threatened by loss of control than B's, but rather that under cer-
tain circumstances A's are threatened and under other circumstances
B's are threatened.
Review of the Learned Helplessness Literature
Recent research has demonstrated that organisms which experience
inescapable noxious stimulation showed impaired performance on sub-
sequent instrumental tasks. This phenomenon, described by Seligman
(1975) as "learned helplessness", has been observed with infrahumans
(e.g., Overmier & Seligman, 1967; Seligman & Maier , 1967) as well as
sometimes with humans (e.g., Hiroto & Seligman, 1975; Krantz, Glass,
& Snyder, 1974). Seligman has proposed that learned helplessness
occurs because the organism learns that its reinforcements are inde-
pendent of its responses (i.e., that it lacks control over its out-
comes), and this learning undermines the motivation to initiate further
instrumental responses.
Although research with animals has generally supported learned
helplessness theory (see Maier & Seligman, 1976, for a recent review),
results of studies using human subjects have yielded many conflicting
findings. In brief, some researchers have clearly demonstrated help-
lessness in humans (e.g., Roth & Kubal, 1975; Krantz, Glass, & Snyder,
1974; Hiroto, 1974). Other researchers, however, claim to have found
with conceptually identical manipulations something quite the opposite
of helpless behavior. Subjects exposed to an experience with noncon-
tingent reinforcement seemed to behave less passively and perform better
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than control subjects on the experimental tasks designed to test
for helplessness effects (e.g., Roth & Bootzin, 1974; Thornton
& Jacobs, 1972; Glass, 1977).
From the start, this "facilitation" effect was dealt with as
relevant to the helplessness process; as something that might be
incorporated into a theoretical model of helplessness. Roth and
Bootzin (1974) attempted to account for these faciliation effects
by suggesting that the strength of the helplessness training (i.e.,
the impact of the experience with noncontingent reinforcement) was
not sufficient to produce manifestations of helpless behavior in the
test situation. The actual increase in controlling behavior of help-
less subjects in the test situation, the authors argued, may be a
manifestation of a possible curvilinear relationship between experiences
of no control and helpless behavior. Such a relationship suggests
that an initial reaction to feelings of no control is to behave asser-
tively in an attempt to reestablish and exercise control, whereas re-
peated experience with no control leads to passive, helpless behavior
(cf. Wortman & Brehm, 1975). Roth and Bootzin' s (1974) analysis
alludes to the general importance of a subject's experience of noncon-
tingency for that subject's subsequent behavior. However, their analysis
does not specify those variables which are likely to contribute to
variations in the subjective impact of noncontingency
.
The problems encountered in human helplessness research not found
in the generally successful animal research in the area may be explained
by differences in the cognitive capacities of humans and animals.
While animals are presumably limited in their cognitive capacities,
it is likely that humans, given their comparatively extensive cognitive
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abilities, attempt to control events during training and subsequently
develop explanations for their failure to do so.
Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) have proposed a reformu-
lation of the original learned helplessness model that addresses the
majority of the problems and criticisms of the earlier model. Accord-
ing to the reformulated account, the individual first learns that
certain outcomes and responses are independent and then makes an attri-
bution about the cause. This attribution determines the person's
subsequent expectation for future noncontingency . This expectation,
in turn, determines both the kind of deficit and its generality and
chronicity.
Seligman (e.g., Abramson et_ al. , 1978) has argued that people's
attributions for their inability to control their outcomes can be
classified along three orthogonal dimensions. Two of these dimen-
sions (internal-external, stable-unstable) have frequently been used
by attribution theorists; the third (global-specific) is new and has
been introduced by the authors. Abramson et_ al_. (1978) do not define
the internal-external dimension, but it is generally used to differ-
entiate between causes that stem from the person versus those that
stem from environmental or situational factors. Stable factors are
long-lived and recurrent; unstable factors are short-lived and inter-
mittent. Global factors occur across situations, whereas specific
factors are more unique to the situation in which helplessness train-
ing was induced. Abramson e_t aT. (1978) predict that attributions
to internal factors are more likely to be characterized by self-esteem
loss than attributions to external factors. Attributions to stable
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factors should produce deficits with greater chronicity than attri-
butions to unstable factors. Deficits attributed to global factors
are expected to generalize further than those attributed to specific
factors.
The old model was unable to explain why depression was frequently
associated with low self-esteem or why depressed individuals often
make internal attributions for their failure (Abramson et al_. , 1978).
The authors' distinction between personal and universal helplessness
helps overcome each of these problems. The reformulated model specifies
that regardless of whether people attribute lack of control to personal
or universal failings, their depression will be symptomized by sadness
and passivity. However, low self-esteem and high self -blame will be
reported only when they attribute their failures to personal factors.
Abramson et al. (1978) have speculated that depressions may be more
intense if attributions are made to personal or internal factors, but
they have provided no evidence in support of this assertion to date.
In general, the properties of the attribution predict in what
new situations and across what span of time the expectation of help-
lessness will be likely to recur (Abramson et al. , 1978). An attri-
bution to global factors predicts that the expectation will recur
even when the situation changes, whereas an attribution to specific
factors predicts that the expectation need not recur when the situation
changes. An attribution to stable factors predicts than the expectation
will recur even after a lapse of time, whereas the attribution to un-
stable factors predicts that the expectation need not recur after a
lapse of time. Whether or not the expectation recurs across situations
and with elapsed time determines whether or not the helplessness deficits
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recur in the new situation or with elapsed time. As Seligman (e.g.,
Abramson e_t clL.
, 1978) points out, the attribution merely predicts
the recurrence of the expectations but the expectation itself deter-
mines the occurrence of the helplessness deficits. New evidence
may intervene between the initial selection of an attribution and
the new and subsequent situation and may change the expectation.
An important empirical question suggested by the above refor
mulation is whether individuals' assignment of causality for lack of
control affects their feelings of helplessness. Under some conditions
a person who is unable to influence a particular outcome may conclude
that his failure to do so stems from his own personal shortcomings
or inadequacies (Abramson et al., 1978). He may feel that there are
responses that would be effective in controlling the environment,
but that he lacks the ability or motivation to make them. Under
other circumstances, a person may conclude that his failure to exert
control over a particular outcome stems from characteristics of the
task or situation rather than his approach to it. He may feel that
there is no response that he or anyone could make that would change
the situation. A person may make attributions of causality concerning
the uncontrollable outcome itself, or for his inability to foresee,
avoid, or cope with it to his satisfaction (Wortman & Brehm, 1975).
There are a few studies which look at the effects of attributions, as
well as the causes of attributions, in the context of responses to
lack of control and to failure.
Dweck and her associates (Dweck, 1975; Dweck & Repucci, 1973;
Dweck, Davidson, Nelson, & Enna, 1978) have demonstrated the differ-
ential effects of attributions for failure to lack of ability versus
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lack of effort. When fourth-grade girls fail, they attribute their
failure to lack of ability and perform badly on a subsequent cogni-
tive test. Lack of ability is a global attribution (as well as inter-
nal and stable) and implies failure expectation for the new task.
Fourth-grade boys, on the other hand, attribute failure to lack of
effort and do well on the subsequent test. Lack of effort is unstable
ai.d probably more specific (but also internal). Similarly, when stu-
dents are told to attribute failure on math problems to not trying
hard enough, they also do better than if they attribute it to lack
of ability (Dweck, 1975). The ability attribution is one that transfers
to the new situation because it is global, internal and stable. Effort
attributions being more specific and unstable do not transfer to new
situations as well.
To date, four studies have manipulated attributions for helpless-
ness. Klein, Fencil-Morse, and Seligman (1976) confronted both de-
pressed and nondepressed subjects with four discrimination problems,
each containing 10 trials. Subjects received random reinforcement
for their answers on each trial, making the problems impossible to
solve. Some of the subjects were led to attribute this failure to
inadequate ability (internal); others were induced to make an attribu-
tion to task difficulty (external) ; a third group received no attri-
bution instructions. Subjects were then tested for helplessness effects
on an anagram task. Among the nondepressed subjects, there was no
relationship between subjects' attributions of causality and their
subsequent task performance. The deficits of the depressed subjects
under the no-instruction condition were the same as those of the
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depressed subjects in the "internal attribution" group. There were
no deficits in the "external attribution" group. The results suggest
that depressed subjects tend naturally to blame themselves for failure,
and that giving them an opportunity to make external attributions
resulted in an improvement in their performance. These results sup-
port Seligman's reformulation.
Tennen and Eller (1977) attempted to manipulate attributions
by giving subjects unsolvable discrimination problems that were
labeled either progressively easier or progressively harder. The
authors reasoned that failure on easy problems should produce attri-
butions to lack of ability whereas failure on hard problems should
produce attributions to task difficulty. Subjects, in a second pre-
sumably unrelated experiment , then tried to solve soluble anagrams.
In line with the reformulated model (Abramson et al_. , 1978), attri-
butions to inability (easy problems) produced deficits. Attributions
to task difficulty (hard problems) resulted in facilitation of anagram
solving. Abramson e_t al_. (1978) propose that lack of performance
deficits in the task-difficulty group were because their attributions
for helplessness were too specific and also external to produce an
expectation of noncontingency in the test task.
Two studies (Hanusa & Schultz, 1977; Wortman, Panciera, Shuster-
man, & Hibsher, 1976) found that relative to a group exposed to con-
tingent events, neither a group instructed to believe they were per-
sonally helpless nor a group instructed to believe they were univer-
sally helpless on a training task showed subsequent performance de-
ficits on a test task. In fact, in both of these experiments, subjects
who were induced to make attributions to inadequate ability performed
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better in helplessness testing than subjects who made attributions
to situational factors (the difficulty of the task) . These two
studies then refute Seligman's reformulation.
As can be seen from the studies cited above, there is no consis-
tent picture as to what may be occurring in these types of experi-
ments. A basic assumption underlying the reformulated model of
helplessness (Abramson e_t al.
, 1978) is that there is a clear rela-
tionship between the attributions of causality that people make for
their inability to control their outcomes and their subsequent behavior.
However, both Bern (1972) and Nisbett and Wilson (1977) have reviewed
a number of studies that leave grave doubts about the validity of this
assumption. Most investigators who have conducted attribution experi-
ments have assumed that the subject's attributions would reflect overt
behavior and have not bothered to attain behavioral measures. In many
of these experiments, subjects have been asked to indicate their attri-
butions to a variety of causal factors by checking the appropriate
point on a series of rating scales. As Wortman and Dintzer (1978) point
out: Are these causal questions entertained by subjects who are not
cued by these scales?
Partly as a result of the puzzling discrepancy between subject's
attributions and their overt behavior, researchers have begun to study
how attributions are made and how people collect and process infor-
mation that is relevant to their initial attribution (Abelson, 1976;
Davison & Valins , 1971; Fischoff, 1976; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973;
Markus, 1977; Nisbett & Borgida, 1975; Snyder, Schultz, & Jones,
1974). A review of these studies is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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Taken as a whole, however, they suggest that the link between attri-
bution and behavior may not be as straightforward as Abramson e_t al .
(1978) have implied.
One way to answer this question is to expose subjects to uncon-
trollable outcomes and allow them to freely respond. One study has
used this procedure (Hanusa & Schultz, 1977). In this experiment,
subjects were given noncontingent reinforcement, contingent reinforce-
ment, or no pretreatment on a computer-administered concept-formation
task. They were then tested for helplessness effects on a maze task.
Immediately following the experiment, they were asked to make open-
ended attributions for their success or failure on both of these tasks,
Generally, subjects did not spontaneously report attributions for
their success or failure. Typically, subjects responded by repeat-
ing the outcome. Even with further probing, subjects did not give
specific attributions, making any analysis of these data meaningless.
Wortman and Dintzer (1978) offer some further thought on this
matter. If attributions in fact determine the chronicity and general-
ity of helplessness and depression, we would expect people confronted
with uncontrollable outcomes to pose these questions to themselves.
Of course, subjects in the study reported above (Hanusa & Schultz,
1977) may have been concerned about attributions of causality for
their performance but unable to articulate them to the experimenter.
A second possibility is that they may have made attributions while
they were performing the task but forgot these attributions by the
time they were questioned by the experimenter. Alternatively, it
may take a certain amount of time to make an attribution, and subjects
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were questioned before they had formulated an attribution. Yet
another possibility is that the outcome must reach a certain level
of intensity or importance before people ask why it has happened
(cf. Bulman & Wortman, 1977).
Abramson et al. (1978) have proposed that subjects are confronted
with an uncontrollable outcome, make an attribution about its cause,
formulate an expectation of future noncontingency , and then show
symptoms of helplessness. However, there may be several intervening
links between each of these steps. Wortman and Dintzer (1978) sug-
gest that when confronted with an uncontrollable outcome, individuals
develop one or more hypotheses about its cause and about the likeli-
hood of future uncontrollability . They may then attempt to test these
hypotheses by seeking out information about their own behavior in
other settings and/or information about the behavior of others. This
notion of hypothesis-testing may be critical in terms of understanding
the process of helplessness, and deserves more attention than it has
received. It seems important to ask that when individuals are con-
fronted with an uncontrollable outcome, what kinds of information do
they seek out? How do the initial hypotheses that they have developed
affect the way that subsequent information is processed? It also
appears important to ask if individual difference variables affect
the types of hypotheses formed and whether failure affects these
differential hypothesis-testing strategies?
As Roth (Note 5) points out in a recent review of the learned
helplessness area, it is necessary co be able to discriminate among
the various ways in which human subjects might experience objective
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noncontingency in learned helplessness experiments. This will allow
not only for better prediction of the behavioral consequences and
their generalizability , but will lead to a better understanding of
the nature of the behavioral effects that do occur. The learned help-
lessness construct has been applied to a wide range of real-life
phenomena such as depression, the aging process, heart disease, and
environmental stress; and, it has been suggested that it can in fact
explain certain deficits or instances of maladaptive behavior asso-
ciated with them. Roth (Note 5) argues that the only circumstances
that would justify extrapolating from the behavior of human laboratory
subjects to the behavior of persons demonstrating severe psychological
deficits is the one in which it could reasonably be argued that there
were similar phenomenal experiences surrounding the behavior in both
cases. Thus, it is important to discriminate among the various ways
in which laboratory subjects might experience noncontingency and it
is critical to establish an understanding of the phenomenal experiences
related to more severe instances of helplessness in the real world
(Roth, Note 5)
.
General Summary and Statement of Aim
On a general level, it has become clear that an examination of
human helplessness requires a consideration of not only objective
noncontingency, but also requires a consideration of the manner in
which objective noncontingency is experienced by human subjects.
A review of the literature does not yield a clear understanding of
how the Type A-3 dimension interacts with salient uncontrollable
events. Until we understand these findings, we cannot assert that
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A's are more threatened by loss of control than B's. All that is
clearly known is thac under certain circumstances, Type A's have an
elevated threshold of responsivity for uncontrollable cues; and that
under other circumstances, Type B's show this elevated threshold
of responsivity for uncontrollable cues. The salience variable has
been shown to affect the way in which A's and B's respond to uncon-
trollable stressful stimulation. Glass (1977) has suggested that
experience with uncontrollable stressors of high salience may lead to
greater vulnerability to helplessness for Type A's. Helplessness has
been indicated by measuring depressed responding. Until we understand
the meaning of this depressed responding, we are unable to adequately
interpret the experimental findings. The role of attributions have
been examined in the context of the learned helplessness paradigm, and
there exists the possibility that an attributional process interacts
with the response styles of Type A and B subjects. Hypothesis-testing
strategy has been suggested as an intervening link within the learned
helplessness process, and evidence has been offered by Diener and
Dweck (1978) that indicates differential use and effectiveness of
hypothesis-testing in children. Discriminating among the various
ways in which Type A and B subjects might experience noncontingency
would be very important not only in terms of offering an explanation
for the experimental findings reported by Glass (1977), but would
allow for better prediction of the behavioral consequences and their
generalizability , and hopefully would lead to a better understanding
of the nature of the behavioral effects that do occur.
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This study was designed to explore differences between Type A and
B subjects in their task performance during failure. This study was
further designed to inquire into the nature of the experiences Type A
and B subjects perceive before and during exposure to noncontingency
resulting in failure.
In order to examine performance change under failure and the
accompanying cognitive components, subjects were trained on a dis-
crimination learning task that allowed monitoring of their hypothesis-
testing strategies and classification of the sophistication of the
strategies before and during failure. Subjects were requested to
verbalize "what they are thinking about" while performing the task.
In contrast to the usual procedure of soliciting statements of particular
cognitions at prespecified times and of presupposed structure, this
continuous verbalization procedure permitted subjects to report what
cognitions were salient to them as they become salient. This procedure
was modeled after a recent analysis of learned helplessness by Diener
and Dweck (1978). Their study explored individual differences in the
nature, timing, and relative frequency of a variety of achievement-
related cognitions by continuously monitoring verbalizations before and
during failure. Their results revealed striking differences both in
the pattern of performance and in the nature of the verbalizations
made by "helpless" and "mastery-oriented" children (as measured by an
internal-external attribution scale) during failure. These differences
were accompanied by marked differences in hypothesis-testing strategy
change under failure.
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This methodology has its roots in the phenomeno logical model.
Essentially, the qualitative phenomenological method involves emphasis
on a particular phenomenon as it reveals itself to the experiencing
individual (Giorgi, 1971, 1976). According to this view, one must
approach all phenomena with a minimum of presuppositions in order to
allow the meaning to reveal itself (Giorgi, 1976, Note 6). For human
psychological phenomena, this usually means that one must "...capture
phenomena precisely as they are lived by human persons" (Giorgi, 1976,
Note 6, p. 1). Thus this particular methodology made it possible to
analyze differences in the nature, relative frequency, and timing of
cognitions reported by Type A and B subjects as they experience them.
This study, then, addresses the cognitive-motivational differences
between Type A and B subjects by examining whether their verbalizations
differ in a systematic fashion.
For example, do both types make attributions following the same
amount of failure feedback, or do Type A and B subjects perceive
failure and make different attributions depending on the salience
of the situation? Are Moderate Salience A's denying lack of control
through some previously unmeasured attributional process? Do B's
indicate a lower level of expectancy than A's in either salience
condition? Do Type B's maintain a less "personal" view of failure
feedback in high salience conditions because they are less threatened
by loss of self-esteem, and use the feedback more constructively, and
provide themselves with cues for improving performance? Do Type A's
dwell on the negative affect associated with failure in high salience
and perhaps withdraw from the situation by making task-irrelevant
verbalizations?
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In addition, this study was designed to permit an examination of the
precise nature of the performance decrement during failure by analyzing the
changes and effectiveness of hypothesis-testing strategies and addresses
the following types of questions: Do both types utilize the same strategies
prior to failure and differ only after exposure to failure? Does the
salience of the situation influence the effectiveness of the strategies used
by both types? Does the Type A subject try alternative, sophisticated
strategies but abandon them sooner than the Type B subject? Does the
deterioration in performance during a series of failures generally occur
in a gradual fashion or does it tend to occur immediately? Does this occur
for both types and for different levels of salience?
In summary, the present research was aimed at (a) determining the
nature, timing, and relative frequency of a variety of cognitive variables
by continuously monitoring verbalizations during failure and (b) specifying
the course of hypothesis-testing strategies during failure.
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CHAPTER TWO
METHOD
Overview
Subjects were told that the purpose of the experiment was to evaluate
differential linguistic style and the cognitions that accompany problem
solving with college-age populations. All subjects received identical
instructions except as outlined below.
Subjects, classified as either Type A or Type B, worked on a discri-
mination learning task, and the level of their hypothesis-testing strategy
was monitored. After four success (soluble) problems, a failure procedure
(insoluble problems) was instituted, and changes in hypothesis-testing
strategy were assessed. In addition, all subjects were asked to verbalize
what they are thinking about while performing the task.
Half of the subjects in each A-B category were randomly assigned to
one of two conditions: (1) Moderate Salience; and (2) High Salience.
Within the Moderate Salience treatment, the subjects listened to the
experimenter evaluate their performance on the series of dimension tasks
.
The remaining subjects (High Salience) not only listened to these evalua-
tions but, in addition, kept a written record of the evaluations.
Subjects
Subjects were 45 male undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology
courses at Kansas State University who obtained course credit for their
participation. Female subjects were not used because the previous Type A
and learned helplessness research cited utilized only male subjects. Prior
to the experiment, a college student version of the Jenkins Activity Survey
(JAS) was administered during a pretesting session. Discussion of this
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version of the JAS , as well as validity and reliability data for the original
JAS, has been presented in the introduction. Four subjects (two Type A's
and two Type B's) were dropped from the analyses since they did not meet the
criterion of solving 3 out of 4 soluble problems successfully. One additional
subject (Type A) was dropped from the analyses because he indicated verbally
during the session and also on the post-experimental questionnaire that he
definitely did not believe the failure manipulation. The final subject
population included in the analyses totaled 40, 20 Type A's and 20 Type B's,
half of each type were assigned to each of the salience conditions (scores
on the JAS ranged from 1-6 for the Type B's and 9-12 for the Type A's).
Task and Materials
The task consisted of a series of four dimension, two choice discri-
mination problems (cf . Levine , 1966) in which the subject searched for
the one solution that was correct. Each subject was presented with four
soluble problems and four insoluble problems. The first two soluble
problems served as training problems for the subjects, although performance
measures were taken on all eight problems. A problem consisted of a set
of 3" x 5" wire-index stimulus cards contained in a ringed booklet, with
each card containing two stimulus patterns. Each stimulus pattern consisted
of one combination of values for four stimulus dimensions, each of which
can take on two values. The four stimulus dimensions and their associated
values were as follows: (1) letter (A or T) ; (2) letter size (large or
small) ; (3) border shape surrounding the letter (circle or square) ; (4)
border texture surrounding the letter (dashed or solid) . For any given
card, the second stimulus pattern on the card contained the opposite values
from the first stimulus pattern (see Appendix C)
.
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The stimuli were varied in a systematic fashion so that the
subject's hypothesis about the correct solution could be inferred un-
ambiguously from his choices. In order to monitor hypothesis-testing,
a "blank trial" procedure was used in which the subjects did not
receive feedback about the correctness of their responses on the first
three of every four trial blocks (Levine, 1966). A hypothesis is
defined as the consistent selection of a particular stimulus property,
such as the letter T, over four trials prior to feedback. The instruc-
tions explicitly pointed out that no responses by the experimenter
meant neither correct or incorrect. It has been demonstrated that when
subjects receive no feedback, they maintain the same response for the
next trial (Frankel, Levine, & Karpf, 1970; Gumer & Levine, 1971;
Levine, 1966, 1969; Levine, Miller, & Steinmeyer, 1967).
Previous research (Fellows, 1968; White, 1965) has shown that
subjects (i.e., children) frequently display response sets such as
position alternation and position perseveration. To eliminate the
possibility that one of these response sets could be mistaken for a
solution-relevant hypothesis, the stimuli were ordered within a single
block of four trials such that all useful hypotheses could be separ-
ated from position responses. The instructions also explicitly stated
that the only possible solution is one of the letter types, letter
size, border shapes, or border textures.
Procedure
In general, the procedure employed was similar, with specified
exceptions, to that employed by Diener and Dweck (1978) in their analysis
of the experience of failure by children. Upon arrival, each participant
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was met by a male experimenter and taken to a small experimental room
equipped with a table, chair, one-way mirror, and intercom system.
All subjects participated individually. Participants were advised
that the general nature of the experiment concerned concept learning
and that the experimenter was interested in subject's linguistic
style and the cognitions that accompany problem-solving. The instruc-
tions emphasized the importance of subjects verbalizing "what they are
thinking about" while working on the task. They were promised a
complete debriefing after participation and were asked to sign a state-
ment of informed consent if they chose to participate. Additionally,
they were assured of freedom to withdraw from participation at any point
during the procedure.
Training Problems
Since one goal of this study was to examine the effects of failure
feedback on problem-solving strategies and self -perceptions , rather than
to test sophistication of hypothesis use per se , each subject was given
training prior to the test problems. The use of the training set of
problems accomplished two functions: (1) It provided a practice session
to insure that all subjects were capable of solving the problems. (2)
The training problems allowed the subjects ample time to become accustom-
ed to the verbalization procedure.
Hypothesis use during training was monitored by tape recording
subject's responses and measures of ease of training were taken across
both training problems. Ease of training was measured by keeping track
of the amount of hints needed by the subject to find the correct
solution to the problem. At the beginning of each new series of cards,
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all stimulus dimensions (letter type, letter size, border shape, border
texture) were reiterated, all stimulus values were named by the experi-
menter, and the subject was told that there was only one correct answer
for the entire series of cards for that problem.
The following instructions introduced the task:
The task you will be working on is concerned with concept
formation and problem solving ability. Later you will be
looking at cards like the sample in front of you on Card vl
.
Note that each card has two stimulus patterns (one on the
left and one on the right) which vary along four dimensions.
There are specific values associated with each dimension.
Each of the four dimensions has two values. In the sample,
the dimensions and their values are: (1) letter type
with values of A or T_; (2) letter size with values of large
or small; (3) border shape with values of circle or square;
(4) border texture with values of solid or dashed. Each
pattern has one value from each of the four dimensions. I
have arbitrarily chosen one of the eight values as correct.
The idea is for you to figure out what this correct value
is. Look at each card and choose which side, left or right,
contains the correct value. I will then tell you whether
your choice of sides was correct or incorrect. In this way,
you can eliminate the incorrect values and determine the
correct value in a few trials. The object is to figure out
what the correct value is so that you can choose the correct
side as often as possible. At the end of a series of trials,
I'll ask you to tell me the correct value. As you remember,
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there are 16 cards per problem. You will begin with Card //l,
and choose a side - left or right - and then I will tell
you whether you are correct or incorrect, depending on whether
or not the value I have chosen is on the side you select.
Remember, the correct answer will never be a combination of
values. The correct answer will be only one of the eight
values - either circle or square - large or small - A or T -
solid or dashed.
On the first training problem, veridical feedback ("correct" or
"incorrect") was given after every response. Upon completion of a deck
of 16 cards (trials), the subject was asked to verbalize the correct
solution. If the subject was correct, he was told, "Very good", and
then given the second training problem. If the subject was wrong, the
same problem was repeated with a hint provided by the experimenter:
"The correct answer is one of the two shapes, either the square or the
circle. See if you can figure out the right answer. The same answer
is right for this whole deck of cards. Try to be right every time".
For those subjects, if any, who were still unable to reach the correct
solution, the deck was again repeated along with the hint.
On the second training problem, the subject was introduced to the
no-feedback procedure, that is, trials on which no information about
correctness was given following the subject's response. The subject
was told: "I have been saying 'correct' or 'incorrect' each time you
selected either the right side or the left side. From now on I will
not always tell you if you are correct or incorrect. After some cards
I will say nothing. Don't let this bother you. Keep trying to be
correct all of the time. Remember, you are still trying to figure out
45
which of the dimensions is the correct answer for this whole deck of
cards". During the second training problem, feedback was given after
every second response. If the subject was unable to arrive at the
correct answer after going through the deck once, a hint was provided,
and the same problem was repeated. (A criterion of successfully-
solving 3 out of 4 soluble problems without hints was implemented
before the subject's data was included in the data analysis.)
Test Problems
The test problems consisted of two soluble and four insoluble
problems. The two soluble problems were similar in every way to the
training problems except for feedback was now given only after every
fourth response. As mentioned earlier, a criterion of successfully
solving 3 out of the 4 Soluble problems was implemented before the
subject's data was included in the data analyses.
The four Insoluble test problems were similar to the Soluble
test problems in that the subject received feedback after every
fourth response. The Insoluble test problems differed from the
Soluble test problems in the following way. The feedback always
consisted of "incorrect", thus permitting the monitoring of strategy
change following continued failure feedback. In addition, the In-
soluble test problems had an added dimension of color with values
of red or blue. This was introduced to the subject as an added
fifth dimension. It was also pointed out that the subject would
have four additional trials to find the correct solution. This
increased the number of trails (cards) to 20 for each of the four
Insoluble test problems.
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Verbalizations
Due to the nature of the problem being investigated, that is,
the nature of the experiences Type A and Type B subjects perceived
before, during, and after exposure to noncontingency resulting in
failure, the traditional experimental and/or correlational designs
did not provide the most appropriate methodological framework for a
clear understanding of the problem. Therefore, in addition to moni-
toring the changes in hypothesis-testing strategies, it was suggested
to also monitor the verbalizations of subjects as they were performing
the task in the experimental situation. In contrast to the usual
procedure of soliciting statements of particular cognitions at pre-
specified times, the continuous verbalization procedure permitted the
subject to report what cognitions were prominent to them as they
became prominent. Thus, it was possible to analyze differences in
the nature, relative frequency, and timing of cognitions reported by
Type A and Type B subjects.
Verbalizations were continuously monitored and recorded on both
training problems and on the six test problems. Prior to beginning
the training problems, and after the subjects had been given the
instructions for the concept formation problems, the subjects were
asked to begin "thinking out loud". They were told that we were
interested in linguistic style and what kinds of things college-age
people think about while working on tasks of this nature. In order
to dispel inhibitions about making task- irrelevant statements, it
was stressed that subjects think about many different kinds of things,
such as lunch, what they are doing after classes, solving the problems,
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and that the subject should feel free to say out loud anything he was
thinking about. The subject was reminded at the beginning of each
problem "to think out loud". Verbalizations were monitored on training,
soluble and insoluble problems so that changes before, during and
following failure could be assessed.
In order to ensure that all subjects left the experiment feeling
comfortable with their performance, they were completely debriefed
regarding the failure manipulations. The subjects were asked not to
discuss the experiment with their fellow students.
Salience Manipulation
Half of the Type A and Type B subjects received evaluative
feedback from the experimenter as described above (Moderate Salience
condition). The remaining subjects were assigned to a condition in
which efforts were made to enhance their awareness of contingency and
noncontingency (High Salience condition). These subjects were required
to keep a written record of "correct" and "incorrect" answers. They
were provided with a tally sheet (see Appendix E) consisting of line
columns, headed "correct" and "incorrect", for each of the dimension
problems. The sheet also contained the words, "right" and "wrong"
next to each of the pairs of columns. Checkmarks were placed in one
or the other column for each of the feedback trials of a given problem.
These tallies corresponded to whether the subject's choices were correct
or incorrect according to the feedback given by the experimenter. For
example, the first training problem had 16 pieces of feedback infor-
mation, the second training problem had 3 pieces of feedback, the two
Soluble test problems had 4 pieces of feedback, and the four Insoluble
test problems had 5 pieces of feedback information. Subjects were also
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told to circle "right" or "wrong" at the end of each pair of columns
depending on whether or not they had finally found the correct solution.
This procedure made it relatively simple for subjects to see how they
were doing on the problems throughout the session, thereby enhancing
their perceptions of contingency or noncontingency . The above procedure
was similar to that used by Glass (1977, Chapter 8).
In addition, subjects in the High Salience condition were verbally
instructed to pay special attention to the feedback given by the
experimenter, in order to facilitate their learning the correct solution.
Those subjects in the Moderate Salience condition were not given this
additional instruction. This procedure was utilized to further enhance
the subject's awareness of contingency or noncontingency.
Training measures . To ensure that deterioration following failure was
not simply a function of lack of proficiency at the task, training
measures during the first two problems were taken. In addition to
monitoring feedback utilization and sophistication and extent of
hypothesis use during training, the number of hints required during
training was recorded. The hints were given when the subject was
unable to solve the training problems within the specified number
of trials. Four training measures were derived for each subject
from these hints: (1) the total number of hints needed for the four
soluble problems; (2) the number of times more than one set of hints
was needed to solve a given problem; (3) the number of hints needed
on the two soluble test problems (3 & 4) on which feedback was
given every fourth trial; and, (4) the total number of errors across
all four soluble problems.
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Scoring procedures
Classification of hypotheses: Strategies versus Stereotypes .
Useful strategies are sequences of hypotheses that, when followed
perfectly, will eventually lead to a problem solution. Stereotypes
(ineffectual strategies) are sequences of hypotheses that can never
lead to a problem solution because they involve the repeated use of
a disconfirmed hypothesis or the failure to use an allowable hypo-
thesis. In order to assess the subject's use of strategies and
stereotypes, the scoring system used by Diener and Dweck (1978) and
adapted from Gholson, Levine, and Phillips (1972) was used. Since
the proposed study was designed to examine performance decrements
following consistent failure, subjects were given 5 blocks of trials
per problem, and the scoring criterion used to identify a given
stretegy or stereotype was its use on 3 of the 5 trial blocks.
Useful strategies . The useful strategies were further classi-
fied into three types: dimension checking, hypothesis checking,
and focusing (see Gholson et al
.
, 1972, for a more detailed explana-
tion). In dimension checking, the subject proceeds through all five
dimensions (letter type, letter size, border shape, border texture,
and color) in a systematic fashion one dimension at a time. When the
subject tests one value of a dimension, he chooses the one that was
consistent with the feedback on the previous trial. When a hypothesis
held is disconf irmed at or after the second feedback trial, the sub-
ject recognizes that it is logically impossible for the other hypo-
thesis on the dimension to be correct. To put it another way, if
some hypothesis is held by the subject he can recognize that because
this particular hypothesis was consistent with the feedback at the
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time of its selection, its complement must of necessity have been
inconsistent with the feedback at that time, and hence cannot be the
solution. According to this strategy, then, the subject goes through
the dimensions one at a time, manifesting only one hypothesis per
dimension. For example, suppose the subject tests the shape dimension
on the previous trial by choosing a circle with the letter A and
was told "incorrect". If the subject is now testing the letter
dimension, he will choose T, for on the previous trial he was able to
eliminate the letter A.
In hypothesis checking, the subject eliminates only one possible
solution per feedback. Ten (eight) hypotheses are ordered by the
subject into the pairs of hypotheses from each of the five (four)
dimensions, as though the subject imagines a list of the pairs of
hypotheses. He goes through this list, testing each hypothesis in
turn, one dimension at a time. Thus he tries a hypothesis, then if it
is disconf irmed, he tries its complement (the opposite hypothesis on
the same dimension). If that is disconf irmed he tries a hypothesis
from another dimension, then its complement, etc. The hypotheses are
samples in a locally consistent manner, i.e., consistent with the
information in the last disconf irming trial. For example, suppose
the subject tests the shape dimension by choosing a circle with the
letter A and receives "incorrect" feedback; if the subject then decided
to test the letter dimension, he would still try both A and T_ on
subsequent trials.
Focusing occurs when the subject chooses hypotheses that are
not only locally consistent but consistent with all the preceeding
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feedback trials. The subject processes information perfectly and eli-
minates all dimensions that have been logically disconfirmed on each
feedback trial. For example, consider a maximally efficient subject,
one who starts with all eight (ten) hypotheses, eliminates four of these
at feedback trial one (Fl) , two more at F2 , and the final incorrect
hypothesis at F3, leaving only the correct hypothesis. For this subject,
his first hypothesis will be consistent with the feedback information
at Fl, his second hypothesis will be different from the first and will
be consistent with the information at both Fl and F2 , and his third
hypothesis will be correct. The above process is for eight dimensions,
but also applies to ten dimensions in the same manner.
Stereotypes . Stereotypes (ineffectual task strategies) are response
sets that can never lead to the solution of the problem. The three
stereotypes of interest here were stimulus preference, position alter-
nation, and position perseveration. Stimulus preference refers to
the selection of a single stimulus characteristic (for example, the
shape circle) independent of feedback. Position alternation occurs
when the subject alternately chooses the left and then the right
stimulus regardless of what they are (for example, LRLR or RLRL)
.
Position perseveration occurs when the subject chooses the stimulus
in the same position each time regardless of feedback.
Verbalization Categories
Categories : The tape recordings of the subjects' verbalizations
were listened to in their entirety by the author, who was blind to the
group membership of subjects making the verbalizations. A category
system was then adopted and modeled after Diener and Dweck (197S)
.
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This existing category system appeared to be sufficiently broad and
encompassing enough to be appropriate for the data collected. The
categories are described below:
1. Statements of useful-task strategy . These were statements
of a plan or system that under normal conditions would eventually lead
to a solution. These statements corresponded to strategies.
2. Statements of ineffectual approach to task . These were
statements that ignored the experimenter's feedback and would not lead
to problem solution under normal conditions. These statements corres-
ponded to stereotypes rather than strategies.
3. Attributions . Five categories were adopted attributing
responsibility to subject's ability, chance, subject's efforts, task
difficulty, or to the experimenter.
4. Self-instructions . These statements referred to instructions
the subject gave to himself that, if followed, could improve perfor-
mance, such as a direction to slow down or to concentrate more.
5. Self-monitoring . Verbalizations in this category were statements
that described the subject's solution-oriented behavior other than the
subject's task strategy, such as monitoring his own effort expenditure
or concentration.
6. Statements of positive affect . These were statements indicating
that the task was enjoyable or a challenge, and statements indicating
that the subject wished to continue doing the problems.
7. Statements of negative affect . This category included statements
that indicated boredom, anxiety, or a desire to terminate the task or
to escape from the situation.
8. Positive prognostic statements. These were statements expressing
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a subject's high expectancy of success or indicating a belief that he
would solve the problem if given sufficient opportunity.
9. Solution-irrelevant statements . Statements in this category were
completely irrelevant to solution attainment and were often, although
not necessarily, irrelevant to the task.
Raters: At the conclusion of the study, all verbalizations were
categorized by two independent female raters. These raters were trained
in the use of the categories utilizing pilot subjects' tapes and were
blind to the nature of the study and to the particular group to which each
subject belonged. Each rater made frequency assignments to the categories
for each subjects' verbalizations on a problem-by-problem basis. Inter-
rater reliabilities were computed using Pearson product-moment correlation
coefficients for each category separately. Only those verbalizations
during the two Soluble (Success) test problems and the four Insoluble
(Failure) test problems were included in the analyses. The reliability
correlation coefficients were computed for the Soluble (Success) and
Insoluble (Failure) test problems separately with a mean reliability
coefficient for the Success problems of r = .932 and a mean coefficient
for the Failure problems of r = .952. The overall mean reliability
correlation coefficient for the thirteen verbalization categories was
_r = .942, with a range of r = .805 to 1.00. (See Appendix F for individual
category interrater reliability coefficients.)
Each rater's frequency assignment for each subjects' verbalizations,
by separate category, was then summed and divided by two to arrive at
the final mean category score for each subject on a problem-by-problem
basis. These scores then, were used in the final analyses.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESULTS
Strategies occurring before and during failure
None of the measures of difficulty - total number of hints needed on
all four Soluble (Success) problems; number of hints needed on the two
training problems; number of hints needed on test problems 3 and 4 (where
feedback after every fourth trial began) ; or the total number of errors
on the four Soluble (Success) problems - pointed to any differences
between the groups in ease of training or ability to work the problems.
Both Type A and Type B subjects, regardless of Salience condition, utilized
feedback appropriately during the training procedure and the two Soluble
(Success) test problems, retaining their hypothesis following the feedback
"correct" and changing hypotheses following the feedback "incorrect." An
analysis of variance was performed on the number of times each subject
used focusing, dimension checking, or hypothesis checking on the two
Soluble (Success) test problems. There was no significant difference
between groups or conditions for the number of times subjects used focusing
or dimension checking, although there was a significant interaction term
for the number of times subjects used hypothesis checking, F(l,36) = 8.313,
_p_ < .007. Internal contrasts indicated that Type A's in the Moderate
Salience condition used hypothesis checking more often than the other three
groups, t(36) = 3.481, £ < .001 (Means: High Salience A's = .3, High
Salience B's .5, Moderate Salience A's = 1.1, Moderate Salience B's = .2).
Upon the introduction of the failure manipulation for the four Insoluble
test problems, the situation changes. Type A's in the High Salience
condition began to use more ineffectual strategies or disconfirmed hypotheses
than the other three groups. Table 1 presents the means for the four trials
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Table 1
Means for Use of Ineffectual or Disconf irmed Hypotheses
Across the Four Insoluble Test Problems:
Type A-B x High-Moderate Salience x Problems Classification
High Sal ience
Type A Type B
Problem 1 0.5 0.1
Problem 2 0.5 0.4
Problem 3 0.9 0.2
Problem 4 1.2 0.3
Moderate Salience
Type A Type B
0.0 0.1
0.2 0.6
0.1 0.2
0.4 0.4
Collapsed across Problem Trials
High Salience Moderate Salience
Type A
Type B
775
250
175
325
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of the Insoluble test problems. The 2x2x4 analysis of variance (Type
A-B x High-Moderate Salience x Four Insoluble Problems) confirmed these
results with a significant interaction term, F(l,36) = 8.091, p_ < .01.
Internal contrasts further concluded that Type A's in the High Salience
condition used more ineffectual strategies or disconfirmed hypotheses than
the other three groups, t(36) = 3.903, £ < .001.
Another way of viewing the data is to look at the sophistication of
the strategies used. It was thought that it would not only be of interest
if the groups varied in their use of ineffectual strategies overall, but
also, if they differed in their use of less sophisticated strategies. It
has been suggested (Diener & Dweck, 1978; Gholson et al. , 1972) that these
strategies can be ordered according to level of sophistication. Scores
were assigned to the subjects' strategies according to a rank ordering
ranging from 6 (most sophisticated) to 1 (least sophisticated) . It was
then determined whether or not the subject's hypothesis testing strategy
improved, remained the same, or deteriorated during failure (see Table 2).
Score values were then assigned of 3, if subject's hypothesis testing
strategy improved; 2, if it remained the same; and 1, if it deteriorated
following failure in order to create an overall degree of deterioration
score. As one can see in Table 2, Type A's in the High Salience condition
exhibited an increased usage of less sophisticated strategies, resulting in
a greater degree of deterioration in their hypothesis-testing strategies, as
did Type B's in the Moderate Salience condition. This pattern of results
was tested by an analysis of variance on these scores revealing a significant
interaction term for Type A-B x High-Moderate Salience, F(l,36) = 17.286,
p_ < .0001. Internal contrasts further indicated that Type A's in the High
Salience condition had a greater degree of deterioration than either
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Table 2
Number of Type A and Type B Subjects whose Hypothesis
Testing Strategy Improved, Remained the Same,
or Deteriorated Following Failure
Improved Same Deteriorated
High Salience
Type A 3 7
Type B 9 1
Moderate Salience
Type A 19
Type B 6 4
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High Salience B's or Moderate Salience A's (£S < .05). However, High
Salience A's and Moderate Salience B's did not differ significantly from
each other, t(36) = 1.603, £ > .10.
In order to appreciate the specific pattern of performance following
failure, one must examine the problem-by-problem change. Table 3 shows
the percent of Type A and Type B subjects in High or Moderate Salience
exhibiting each type of strategy or stereotype on each of the four Insoluble
(Failure) test problems. As can be seen from Table 3, High Salience A's
showed a progressive decrease in the use of legitimate strategies with an
attendant increase in ineffectual responses. Moderate Salience B's also
demonstrated increased use of ineffectual strategies by the second failure
problem. However, on the third and fourth problems the situation changed
such that only 10% of Moderate Salience B's were using ineffectual
strategies on the last failure problem. Both High Salience B's and
Moderate Salience A's behaved in a similar manner and did not use ineffectual
strategies on the third and fourth failure problems.
The effects depicted in Table 3 were virtually duplicated with an
analysis of the sophistication of strategy use across the four insoluble
problems. This is perhaps not surprising, since the measures are obviously
not independent. As may be observed in Table 4, Type A's in the High
Salience condition are using far less sophisticated strategies than the
other three groups by the fourth insoluble problem. High Salience A's
are increasingly using less sophisticated strategies across the four problems.
Moderate Salience B's, however, begin to exhibit the use of less sophisticated
strategies on Insoluble Problem 2, but then improve their performance on the
last two insoluble problems. The 2x2x4 analysis of variance (Type A-B x
High-Moderate Salience x Four Insoluble Problems) for the scores on the level
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Table 4
Means for Level of Sophistication of Hypothesis-testing
Strategy on the Four Insoluble Test Problems: I
Type A-B x High-Moderate Salience x Problems Classification
High Salience
Type A Type B
Moderate Salience
Type A Type B
Problem 1
Problem 2
Problem 3
Problem 4
4.7 5.0
4.4 4.6
3.9 4.7
3.2 4.8
5.2 5.0
4.6 3.9
4.8 4.6
4.6 4.5
Collapsed across Problem Trials
High Salience Moderate Salience
Type A
Type B
4.05
4.78
4.80
4.50
The higher the number, the higher level of sophistication of strategy use
(6 = most sophisticated; 1 = least sophisticated).
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of strategy sophistication confirmed the above pattern of performance. The
analysis revealed a Problems main effect, F(3,36) = 22.5695, £ < .0001, such
that sophistication of strategy use decreased across the four insoluble
problems. In addition there were interactions between Type and Salience,
F(l,36) = 4.5832, £ < -05, Type and Problems, F(3,36) = 10.5193, p_ < .001,
and between Salience and Problems, F(3,36) = 7.0904, £ < .001. These
second-order interactions are explicable in terms of an obtained triple
interaction (Type x Salience x Problems), F(3,36) = 3.6615, £ < .05.
Internal contrasts further indicated that High Salience A's used signifi-
cantly less sophisticated strategies than the other three groups, t(36) =
3.4906, £ < .001, overall.
In summary, the statistical analyses so far have all shown large and
significant differences in the performance of Type A's and Type B's in
High and Moderate Salience conditions during and following failure. High
Salience A's have been shown to use more ineffectual strategies or dis-
continued hypotheses across the four Insoluble (Failure) test problems.
In fact, it has been demonstrated that High Salience A's used these ineffec-
tual strategies more than three times as often as the other three groups
by the end of the fourth failure problem (see Tables 1 and 3) . One may
notice that Moderate Salience B's did not use as many ineffectual or less
sophisticated strategies as the High Salience A's, though they did show
increased usage compared to either High Salience B ' s or Moderate Salience A's
Thus, the strategy-change data demonstrated that behavior following
failure is dramatically different for Type A's and B's in the High and
Moderate Salience conditions. It appears, in fact, that High Salience A's
are beginning to exhibit deterioration in their performance, resembling
helplessness, when faced with noncontingency resulting in failure. Moderate
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Salience B's, on the other hand, are showing some deterioration in their
use of effective strategies when first confronted with the noncontingency
,
but helplessness, per se, is not evident nor indicated by their strategy-
change data.
The results presented thus far replicate previous research (Glass, 1977)
in that marked performance differences may be observed between Type A and
Type B subjects dependent upon the salience condition. However, the full
extent of these differences is still unclear unless we examine the cognitive
concomitants of the performance changes as well.
Verbalizations: What are Subjects Saying ?
In order to provide a clear view of what the subjects were saying (and
thinking about) during the experiment, the verbalizations were analyzed for
the Soluble (Success) test problems and the Insoluble (Failure) test problems
separately. The mean frequency scores for the subjects' verbalized re-
2
sponses, by verbalization category, are presented in Table 5.
Success Trials . During the first two soluble test problems, where subjects
were allowed to succeed, there were few marked differences. The analysis
of variance (Type A-B x High-Moderate Salience) did indicate, however, that
Type A's made more statements of useful-task strategy, F(l,36) = 4.618,
p_ < .04. Both High Salience A's and Moderate Salience B's made more state-
ments indicating their awareness of the increased difficulty of the task,
F(l,36) = 5.297, p_ < .03, than did the other two groups. There was a marginally
significant interaction term, F(l,36) = 3.077, p_ < .09, for statements of
positive affect, along with significant main effects for Type, F(l,36) =
4.431, £ < .05, and Salience, F(l,36) = 6.923, £ < .02. 3y examining the
means in Table 5, rows 19 and 20, for statements of positive affect, it is
apparent that Moderate Salience B's were enjoying the task, more so than the
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other three groups.
For the most part, the verbalizations during the two soluble (success)
test problems indicated an absence of major differences between the groups.
Type A's and Type B's in the two salience conditions did not appear to
respond very differently. However, the ego involvement of Type A's and
their resultant achievement motivation was apparent in their statements
of useful-task, strategy. At the same time, the Type B's seemed to be enjoying
themselves more during this part of the task.
Failure Trials . Striking differences began to emerge when the subjects
experienced the noncontingency resulting in failure on the four insoluble
test problems. High Salience A's began making increasingly more statements
of ineffectual approach to the task, that ignored the experimenter's feedback
and that would not lead to problem solution under normal conditions (see
Table 5). Type A's in the High Salience condition attributed responsibility
for their failure on the insoluble test problems primarily to their own
ability, and to a lesser extent, the difficulty of the task. In addition,
High Salience A's began to increasingly express negative affective statements.
Their unhappiness with the experimental situation was characterized by state-
ments such as: "This is really starting to get to me"; "Oh, shit!"; "Damn
it, that was a stupid mistake"; "(sigh) - I don't know how in the world I'm
going to do these"; "This is taking a long time"; "I'm not sure this is worth
all the hassle for a few points"; "I'm really getting perturbed".
Conversely, Moderate Salience B's did not make statements of ineffectual
approach to the task. They did begin to make some statements attributing
their failure on the insoluble problems to their own ability, but as the
failure experience continued, they attributed their failure more so to the
difficulty of the task (see Table 5). Moderate Salience B's expressed
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extreme unhappiness with the task situation by making negative affective
statements such as: "I sure wish this would get over with"; "This is sort
of boring"; "This isn't much fun"; "This is ridiculous"; "This is sure taking
a long time"; "Oh, Boy! What can I do now"; as well as a considerable amount
of cursing. However, this unhappiness was mediated by their making some
statements of positive affect and positive prognostic statements such as:
"I've almost got it figured out now"; "I'm sure I'll get it"; "I'll get
the next one for sure".
The analysis of variance confirmed the above patterns of responding. As
Table 6 indicates, the category "Statements of ineffectual task strategy"
reveals significant main effects for Type A-B, F(l,36) = 10.670, p_ < .002,
and High-Moderate Salience, F(l,36) = 4.256, p_ < .05. There was also a
marginally significant Type x Salience interaction term, F(l,36) = 3.576,
£ < .07. Internal contrasts revealed that the main effects were largely due
to High Salience A's responses, t(36) = 4.17, £ < .001. The analysis of
variance also demonstrated differences between the groups for the "Ability
attribution" and "Task-difficulty attribution" categories with significant
Type x Salience interaction terms, F(l,36) = 4.778, £ < .04 and F(l,36) =
5.329, £ < .03, respectively. High Salience A's attributed responsibility
for their failure more to internal causes (i.e., ability); whereas, Moderate
Salience B's made more attributions to external causes (i.e., task difficulty)
Furthermore, as Table 6 indicates, the analysis of variance reveals a signi-
ficant Type x Salience interaction term for "Statements of negative affect",
F(l,36) = 6.636, £ < .02. Both Moderate Salience B's and High Salience A's,
to a slightly lesser degree, expressed unhappiness and negative affect during
the experimental situation.
In summary, the results of the analyses of variance of the verbalization
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Table 6
Analysis of Variance of Verbalization Categories
for Insoluble (Failure) Problems:
Type A-B x High-Moderate Salience Classification
Category of Verbalizations Effect F-value
Useful task strategy
Ineffectual task strategy
Ability attribution
Chance attribution
Effort attribution
Task difficulty attribution
Experimenter attribution
Self- instructions
Self-monitoring
Statements of positive affect
Statements of negative affect
Positive prognostic statements
Solution irrelevant statements
Type 3.890 060
Type 10.670 .002
Salience 4.256 .050
Type x Salience 3.576 .070
Type x Salience 4.778 .040
N.S. — —
N.S. __ __
Type x Salience 5.329 .030
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
Salience 4.017 .060
Type x Salience 6.636 .020
Type x Salience 3.652 .070
N.S.
df (1,36)
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categories revealed important quantitative and qualitative differences in
verbalized responses of High and Moderate Salience Type A's and B's. Type
A's in the High Salience condition made significantly more statements of
ineffectual approach to the task. This pattern of responding corresponded
to the actual strategies they used as demonstrated by the performance data
presented earlier. High Salience A's made personal, internal attributions
to their own ability for failure on the insoluble problems and it appeared
that they didn't expect to do very well when confronted with failure.
Moderate Salience B's, on the other hand, did not verbalize statements of
ineffectual approach to the task. They indicated that they were quite
unhappy and they attributed their failure to the difficulty of the task. In
fact, Moderate Salience B's picked up on the reality of the situation -
the task was difficult. These Type B's were behaving appropriately under the
given circumstances.
It is also interesting to note the qualitative differences between the
negative affective verbalizations of the High Salience A's and the Moderate
Salience B's. The Type A's in the High Salience condition were expressing
negative affect that indicated anxiety, and which focused on themselves, being
directed internally. The Moderate Salience B's, however, made negative
affective statements that indicated boredom and a desire to escape or avoid
the task situation. These negative affective statements were directed more
externally and towards the task, rather than to themselves.
Post-Experimental Questionnaire
Upon completion of the experimental procedure, all subjects were asked
to complete a questionnaire that was designed to assess the subjects'
perceptions of the experiment and to judge whether or not the failure
manipulations were successful (see Appendix G) . (The means for the post-
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experimental questionnaire items may be found in Appendix I, Table 4.)
On all but one item, a series of analyses of variance revealed no significant
differences between groups or conditions. The one exception was the question
"For the same concept formation tasks, did you generally feel that there
really was a solution to the problems?" This question pertained to the
five dimension Insoluble (Failure) test problems. There was a statistically
significant main effect for Type, F(l,36) = 4.286, p_ < .05. However, when
one examines the means (Type A = 2.25 and Type B = 1.75) on a seven-point
scale (1 = was a solution, and 7 = was not a solution) the magnitude and
meaning fulness of the Type A-B main effect decreases.
In addition, subjects were asked to assign percentage estimates of
responsibility, regarding their performance, for the outcome on the tasks
for five attributions (see Appendix H) . The subjects did this for the four
dimension (Soluble) and five dimension (Insoluble) problems separately.
Being that the percentage estimates for the five attributions totaled
a constant (100 percent) and lacked independence, the data were transformed
utilizing a square root, arc tangent transformation procedure (Arheart,
Note 6), in order to accomodate a multivariate analysis of variance procedure.
(The means for the five attributions for Type A-B x High-Moderate Salience x
Success-Failure may be found in Table 7.)
The overall MANOVA for the five attributions, using Wilk's criterion
(Barr, Goodnight, Sail, & Helwig, 1976), is presented in Table 8. The
MANOVA revealed two statistically significant main effects for Type A-B,
F(5.32) = 8.97, £ < .001, and Success-Failure (repeated), F(5,32) = 3.36,
£ < .05. As can be noted in Table 8, Type A and Type B subjects, regardless
of salience condition, differed significantly in regards to their self reports
of attributions, and this tended to change during failure. Due to the
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significant main effects for Type A-B and Success-Failure on the multivariate
test, it was possible to examine the univariate tests. Type A subjects
attributed more responsibility for the outcome of the tasks to their own
ability and effort, both of which are internal causes, and less to chance,
task difficulty or experimenter. Type A's were relatively consistent in
their assignment of attributions across success and failure problems (see
Table 7). During experiences with success, the Type B's attributed respon-
sibility fairly evenly to ability, chance, effort, and task difficulty.
The change in percentage estimates of responsibility from success to failure
appears to be due primarily to the Type B's. The main effect for Success-
Failure (see Table 8) indicates a shifting of the Type B's attributions to
their own ability during success to an attribution to the difficulty of the
task during failure. This pattern of results, in fact, indicates how the
Type A and B subjects encoded their attributions of responsibility for their
failure on these problems at the close of the experiment. Thus, Type A's
blamed their abilities for their failure, even though both Type A's and Type
B's had learned the task equally well, had equal degrees of success during
training, and had received equal amounts of failure feedback. Type B's, on
the other hand, shifted their attributions from ability to task difficulty
when confronted with the noncontingency, which in fact, was appropriate
behavior for this situation.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DISCUSSION
As may be recalled, this study was designed to explore the differences
between Type A and E subjects in their performance on a cognitive task during
failure; and further, to inquire into the nature of the experiences of Type
A's and B's before and during exposure to noncontingency resulting in failure.
Previous research (Glass, 1977) has suggested Chit Pattern A may be thought
of as a response style for coping with perceived lack of control over
environmental stress. Glass (19 77) concluded that enhanced efforts at control
lead to greater vulnerability to helplessness after extended experience with
uncontrollable events of high salience. Type A's have been observed to
respond to highly salient losses of environmental control by making greater
initial efforts than B's to reassert control followed by more extreme giving
up relative to B's. When the uncontrollable event is moderately salient,
Type A's actually make less effort than Type B's to reassert control and do
not give up, whereas Type B's do. Previous research, however, has not offered
a compelling explanation of why the Type A-B dimension interacts with salient
uncontrollable events. The present results are consistent with previous research
(Glass, 1977) in that marked performance differences have been observed between
Type A and Type B subjects, dependent upon the salience classification: High
Salience A's began to use more ineffective and less sophisticated strategies
during the failure experience and to a lesser extent, so did Moderate Salience 3's,
The present data provide a clearer understanding of the manner in which
objective noncontingency is experienced by Type A and B subjects. As may
be recalled from the results presented earlier, it was noted that Type A's
and Type B's differed in their self-reported attributions for responsibility
of failure on the test problems. At the close of the experiment, Type A's
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tended to attribute failure to internal causes (i.e., their own ability).
It was also noted on the post-experimental questionnaire that Type A's
believed the failure problems were less soluble than did Type B's, possibly
because they felt the problems were not soluble for them. Furthermore,
during the failure experience, High Salience A's increasingly verbalized
that they attributed their failure on the problems to their own ability.
At the same time, as their strategy performance was deteriorating, they
acknowledged their use of ineffectual strategies by verbalizing statements
of ineffectual approach to the task. Their verbalizations were further
characterized by negative affective statements indicating unhappiness with
their performance. The present data suggest, therefore, that High Salience
A's are experiencing personal helplessness (cf. Abramson et al
.
, 1978) when
confronted with noncontingency resulting in failure.
On the other hand, there is no evidence to suggest that Moderate Salience
B's were experiencing the same kind of helplessness. Type B's in the moderate
salience condition did evidence some deterioration in their strategy perfor-
mance during failure. However, they generally did not make statements of
ineffectual approach to the task. During the failure experience they tended
to attribute their failure on the problems to external causes (i.e., task
difficulty). Their self-reported attributions, at the close of the experiment,
corresponded with how they felt during the failure experience. In fact, it
appears that Moderate Salience B's appropriately encoded the failure non-
contingency as being attributed to task difficulty. In addition, Moderate
Salience B's expressed negative affect directed at the task, indicating
boredom and a desire to escape the situation. This observed pattern of
responding resembles what Seligman has termed universal helplessness (cf.
Abramson et al
.
, 1978). Moderate Salience B's appear to view the noncontin-
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gency as a situation in which neither they nor relevant others can control -
they attribute failure to the difficulty of the task. Miller and Norman
(1979) have proposed a similar model as Seligman's reformulated account.
They suggest that performance deficits that occur as a result of attributions
to relatively variable external causes such as experimenter control or task
difficulty, as with the Moderate Salience B's, are really "pseudohelplessness"
because they do not represent a change in the individual's basic expectancies
or mode of adaptation. Deficits that occur as a result of attributions to
stable, internal causes do result in more lasting, generalized learned
helplessness, if in fact, the expectation of uncontrollability is generalized
as is the case with personal helplessness.
The present data also seems to be consistent with the attentional inter-
pretation offered by Matthews and Brunson (in press) . This notion suggests
that Type A' s attend to the most salient aspects of their environment and
inhibit their attention to any peripheral cue or task-irrelavent event that
might deter them from their performance. Type A's in the high salience
condition appeared to focus their attention on task-relevant issues as
evidenced by their continued involvement with searching for a correct solution
for the insoluble problems. Even their internal attributions to ability and
their expressions of negative affect were task related. Moderate Salience B's,
however, appeared to divide their attention between their performance on
the task itself and to external events such as the noncontingency of the task,
as indicated by their task difficulty attributions.
The relative significance of the learned helplessness paradigm is
largely tied to the degree of generalization that occurs. Roth and Bootzin
(1974) have succinctly addressed this issue of generalization: "The major
question is whether an induced external expectancy generalizes to a new
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situation, not whether it controls behavior in the situation it is induced"
(p. 255). Clearly, a reduction of responding in a situation in which responses
do not influence outcomes is an adaptive behavior. It becomes maladaptive
only when it is transferred or generalized to new situations in which outcomes
are contingent on responses. Within this context, it may be suggested that
Moderate Salience B's are, in fact, exhibiting appropriate behavior when
confronted with uncontrollable events. They become aware of the true contin-
gencies of the situation, and they attribute their failure on insoluble problems
to the difficulty of the task. High Salience A's, however, appear to respond
to extended salient uncontrollable events in a maladaptive manner. They
struggle to find the correct solution; fail in their attempts; and relate
this failure experience to attributions towards their own ability and unsuccessful
performance. Further, this individual difference variable may very well
predict the behavior that is generalized to a future task. Seligman and his
associates have made the implicit assumption that helpless responding is
maladaptive. The issue regarding whether helplessness is adaptive has been
discussed in some detail by Wortman and Brehm (1978) and, therefore, will not
be repeated here. Briefly, however, they believe that many of the behaviors
associated with helplessness (giving up, losing interest in the outcome, or
losing interest in the motivation to pursue it) are maladaptive only when the
outcome in question is controllable or modifiable. If the outcome is truly
uncontrollable, these behaviors may be highly functional (cf. Weiss, 1971),
as with the behavior exhibited by Moderate Salience B's.
The strengths of the present methodology deserve some mention. Previous
research methodologies have been limited by self-report measures on post-
experimental questionnaires. The present data provides an added insight by
exploring the phenomenology of the behavior and the cognitive concomitants
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of the performance changes. The consistency of the data on both behavioral
and cognitive measures has been evident. Also the self -report data from the
post-experimental questionnaire provided an indication of how the subjects
actually encoded the experimental experience. There are obviously some
limitations to the methodology adapted for this study. Many questions still
remain unanswered such as why the high salience condition did not interest
the Type B's. The phenomenology of the behaviors they exhibited have not
provided any clues.
Obviously, further research is necessary in order to determine the full
extent and impact of the attributional process on the learned helplessness
phenomenon. Furthermore, how does it come to be that Type A's and B's tend
to formulate different attributions, at different times, when exposed to
salient uncontrollable events, resulting in failure outcomes? The present
research has been successful in distinguishing not only the performance
differences of A's and B's in high and moderate salience conditions, but
also has pointed to distinctions in the cognitive concomitants of the
performance changes during and following exposure to uncontrollable events.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND SPECULATIONS
Type A individuals in the high salience condition and Type B's in the
moderate salience condition, to a lesser extent, exhibited performance decre-
ments across a series of insoluble concept formation problems. The behavioral
cognitive and self-report measures reflect a consistency of the data. These
results suggest that High Salience A's are beginning to experience personal
helplessness (cf. Abramson et al
.
, 1978) and may continue to do so if, in
fact, the expectations of uncontro liability were generalized to a new
situation. Conversely, Moderate Salience B's appear to be "pseudohelpless",
that is, they are experiencing universal helplessness.
The present data suggest an important modification of current attribution
theory (Eswara, 1972; Rest, Nierenberg, Weiner, & Heckhausen, 1973; Weiner,
Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, & Rosenbaum, 1971; Weiner & Kukla, 1970). These
studies suggest and support the hypothesis that if one attributes failure to
an internal cause (e.g., ability), self-depreciation and negative affect
result; whereas, attributions of failure to an external cause (e.g., task
difficulty) minimizes this affect. In the present study negative affective
expression was manifested in the verbalizations of both High Salience A's
and Moderate Salience B's, to a greater extent, during their experiences
with failure noncontingency . However, the data revealed distinct qualitative
differences between High Salience As' and Moderate Salience Bs' negative
affective responses. High Salience As' responses reflected dissatisfaction
and unhappiness with their performance that corresponded with their internal
self-attributions. Moderate Salience B's, on the other hand, actually
expressed more prevalent negative affect, but these responses were directed
at the task, indicating boredom and a desire to escape the situation. The
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present data suggest that individuals, in situations where there is failure
noncontingency , express considerable negative affect and make different attri-
butions for their failure. However, only certain kinds of negative affect
will accompany the learned helplessness process; that is, negative affect
which is internally directed (e.g., High Salience A's responses of unhappiness
with their performance)
.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect that when exposed to highly
salient uncontrollable events in natural settings, not just experimental
situations, Type A's would also be more likely to manifest motivation and
performance decrements and make internal attributions which accompany these
performance deficits. These decrements have been variously labeled as
"helplessness" or "giving up". Since coronary victims often report a greater
frequency of uncontrollable life events in the period preceding their infarc-
tion, a number of researchers (e.g., Engel , 1968; Green et al . , 1972)
have suggested that helplessness may be a precursor of coronary heart disease
(CHD) . This association between helplessness and CKD underscores the impor-
tance of understanding the factors potentiating the greater susceptibility
of Type A's to the effects of uncontrollability . It may be reasonable to
assume, therefore, that attributions and attentional differences mediate
the relationship between Pattern A, helplessness, and CHD.
One optimisitc implication of the present research is that Type A
reactions to uncontrollable events may be ammenable to change. These findings
suggest a number of possible directions for the design of therapies or inter-
vention techniques for coronary-prone (i.e., Type A) individuals. For
example, we might speculate that the individual who is threatened by the
occurrence or reoccurrence of CHD would do well to learn to better predict,
recognize, and acknowledge uncontrollability in his or her environment. For
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to do otherwise might enhance the deleterious effects of uncontrollable
stimulation and increase the likelihood of CHD. The implication for the
Type A who struggles to keep abreast of his numerous and often arbitrary
goals and deadlines is that he should become realistic and flexible enough
so that unavoidable delays and setbacks do not represent disconf irmation of
a particularly high expectation that the task will be completed successfully.
Paralleling this notion, Wortman and Dintzer (1978) maintain that adaptive
responding to aversive life events can be facilitated not by designing treat-
ments to minimize helplessness but by teaching people to make accurate
assessments of their ability to influence their outcomes and make accurate
attributions for their failure to do so. This reasoning suggests that for
pseudohelplessness (universal helplessness) , exposure to experiences of
response-outcome dependence and success will alleviate deficits. The success
of this treatment with nondepressed subjects has been demonstrated by Kilpatrick-
Tabak and Roth (Note 7), but was not found effective with depressed subjects.
According to Seligman's reformulated model (Abramson et al . , 1978) and Miller
and Norman's (19 79) attribution-theory model, treatment of personal helpless-
ness would require direct focus on changing the attributions themselves
.
Examples of these changes and the effectiveness of this type of treatment can
be seen in the studies of Klein et al . (1976) and Dweck (1975).
Other treatment strategies such as relaxation procedures (e.g., wolpe,
1958) may play a useful role in the therapeutic intervention with Type A's
involved in salient uncontrollable experiences. There is already evidence
(Suinn, 1974) indicating that subjects can be trained to react to general
anxiety and stress with relaxation-inducing responses which, in turn, seem
to reduce major risk factors of coronary heart disease, such as cholesterol
and triglyceride levels. Establishing control over physiological reactions
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associated with anxiety seems particularly important in view of the higher
cholesterolemic effects associated with Pattern A response to daily stress
and challenge (Friedman et al
.
, 1958; Jenkins et al . , 1974). But then not
all individuals can relax in this manner, perhaps especially if they try
anxiously to do so, as may be the case for some overmotivated Type A's.
Relaxation is not achieved by simple command or direct effort, but by
deliberately tensing muscle groups (an available voluntary response) and
then "letting go" of that muscle tension (Lowenstein, Note 8). Biofeedback
is assumed to offer a further extension of voluntary self-control over
normally involuntary responses, but here again overmotivated individuals are
unlikely to learn how to reliably produce responses generally associated
with a state of low effort or relaxation.
The research presented up to this point has focused primarily on Pattern
A and learned helplessness. Fogle (1978) has suggested that the persistance
of ins trumen tally ineffective coping behavior constitutes an experimental
converse of learned helplessness and has termed this "learned restlessness".
In these terms, a learned restless individual is one who persists in futile
if not self-defeating attempts to escape a feared or uncontrollable event -
they often are trying too hard. In some respects the concept of learned
restlessness describes the behavior of Type A individuals. Emotional arousal
in the form of anxiety and/ or frustration is naturally prominent in learned
restlessness, just as low arousal and depression are emotional concomitants
of learned helplessness. Literally, the victim of learned restlessness gets
no rest, not even the rest of resignation (Fogle, 1978). This may at first
seem contradictory, but if placed in the context of real-life, natural
settings, the Type A individual may behave repeatedly, throughout his or her
lifetime, as the characterized learned-restless person. The behavior eventually
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after repeated exposure to highly salient uncontrollable events, culminates
in personal learned helplessness. With certain individuals, some degree of
learned helplessness might actually prove, therapeutically, more adaptive
in the long run (Fogle, 1978). This approach has much in common with Frankl's
(1975) dereflection. Here attention is refocused away from goals that often
defy deliberate attainment. The client is encouraged to give up trying.
This does not really break the pattern of restless responding, since even a
response of passivity may be attempted actively and deliberately as a coping
device. The learned restlessness model would tend to suggest that genuine
resignation may often be more helpful than feigned resignation.
This discussion raises and leaves unanswered many questions as to how
therapeutic efforts should be guided in the case of Pattern A, helplessness
and coronary heart disease. A detailed discussion of clinical practice in
this area cannot be attempted here; however, the clinical literature provides
many examples to be examined. The learned helplessness and learned restless-
ness models offer competing therapeutic messages. The appealing goal, for
clients, clinicians and physicians alike, that more and better coping is better,
leads to the notion that trying harder helps. The learned restlessness model,
then, seems almost counterintuitive, at least to work-oriented Western minds
and the classic Type A individual. In Zen Buddhism, as with other Eastern
tradition, giving up is more readily recognized as an adaptive course in many
situations (Watts, 1957). Even the ultimate goal of enlightenment, after all,
is said to elude deliberate striving, or deliberate non-striving. It is
hopefully suggested that individuals can escape the trap of trying too hard,
with regard to some of their personal and social objectives, by selectively
and appropriately giving up.
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FOOTNOTES
Initially, it was desired to analyze the verbalization data by a 2 (Type A-B)
x 2 (High-Moderate Salience) x 3 (Trial Blocks) analysis of variance (two
between, one within) procedure, with Trial Block 1 consisting of the two
Soluble test problems; Trial Block 2 consisting of the first two Insoluble
test problems; and Trial Block 3 consisting of the last two Insoluble test
problems. Problems 1 and 2 were training problems, and thus, were not
categorized or analyzed. Upon examination of the data, it was discovered
that some verbalization categories contained cases per cell, primarily in
the Soluble problems. Further scrutiny of the data revealed non-normal
distributions for these categories as well as heterogeneity of variance.
These problems were circumvented by analyzing the verbalization categories
by Soluble (Success) and Insoluble (Failure) problems separately, with a
2x2 (Type A-B x High-Moderate Salience) design.
2
A mean frequency response criterion was set at 2.00 for the verbalization
category totals. This was decided on in light of the very small mean
responses in some of the categories: very few responses decrease the
meaningfulness of the data, even though statistical significance may exist.
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Appendix A. Student version of the Jenkins Activity Survey for Health
Prediction.
Permission to use the Jenkins Activity Survey for Health Prediction must
be obtained from the following:
Dr. G. David Jenkins
Department of Psychiatry
School of Medicine
Boston University
Boston, Massachusetts
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APPENDIX B
Informed Consent for Subjects in Experiments
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Informed Consent by Subjects in Experiments
I, have carefully read/ listened to
Print Name
(circle one) and fully understand the instructions for this experiment on
. I give my consent to serve as a subject
Title of Experiment
in this experiment on . I am aware that I can
Date
ask questions or terminate the experiment at any point.
Signature
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APPENDIX C
Concept Formation Problems
Appendix C, Figure 1. Concept Formation Problems
(Four Dimension)
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Appendix C, Table 1
Feedback Sequence for Insoluble (f iveydimension)
Concept Formation Problems
Insoluble (Failure) Problems
Trial Block 1
Trial Block 2
Trial Block 3
Trial Block 4
Trial Block 5
Correct
Incorrect
Correct
Correct
Incorrect
Correct
Correct
Incorrect
Incorrect
Correct
Incorrect
Correct
Incorrect
Correct
Incorrect
Correct
Incorrect
Correct
Incorrect
Correct
Feedback was presented after every fourth response (subject's completion of
each trial block) . Figures 1 and 2 present the ordering of each series of
cards for the four dimension and five dimension problems, respectively.
Order remained the same, but correct solution (four dimension) and feedback
(five dimension) was variable across problems and constant across subjects.
Appendix C, Figure 2. Concept Formation Problems
(Five Dimensions) 103
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APPENDIX D
Verbatim Instructions for the Concept Formation Problems
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Experimenter Script
Hello. My name is Brad, and I'll be your experimenter for this study
that you signed up for. Before we begin, please fill out this permission
slip. The general nature of this experiment concerns concept learning and
I am particularly interested in people's linguistic style and the cognitions
that accompany problem-solving. In other words, I am investigating the
different ways and styles that people have in terms of speech and tonal
quality of their voices, and especially, what they are thinking about when
they work on concept-formation probiem-solving tasks. It occurs to me that
different people think about many different things while working on a variety
of different tasks or problems. I will first be reading to you a set of
instructions that will explain the task and what is involved in successfully
completing this task. I want to emphasize that it is very important, once
we begin, for you to verbalize (state out loud) what you may be thinking
about while working on this task. For example, if you are thinking about
trying to solve the particular problem you are working on, or if you are
thinking about lunch or dinner, or how well you did on the previous problems,
or what is playing on T.V. tonight, or the date you have planned later in
the week or how interesting or disinteresting the problems may be - what-
ever happens to come into your mind - this is what I want you to verbalize.
Please feel completely free to talk about anything and everything that comes
into your mind, including any strategies for problem-solving you may be
thinking about. When you finish the problems I will give you a complete
debriefing, that is explain to you the particulars concerning this experiment
and answer any questions you may have. Please hold those types of questions
until we finish. But any other questions concerning the procedures of the
experiment or the problems - please feel free to interrupt or stop me,
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especially if something is not clear to you. It is important that you
understand the instructions - so if something is confusing or unclear -
please ask me to explain. I'll now be going to the next room and I will
be talking to you via the intercom. The entire experiment will be recorded,
and I will be keeping track of your responses from the other room. The
instructions I read to you from there will explain the details of the task.
You will be working on problems that are in these booklets. Each booklet
contains four problems. Each problem has 16 cards or trials - I use cards
and trials interchangeably. As I mentioned, the remaining instructions will
come to you through the intercom.
Remember, once we begin, please verbalize - say out loud - whatever
you may be thinking about while working on these problems.
The task you will be working on is concerned with concept-formation and
problem-solving ability. Later you will be looking at cards like the sample
in front of you on Card 1. Note that each card has two stimulus patterns
(one on the left and one on the right) which vary along four dimensions.
There are specific values associated with each dimension. Each of the four
dimensions has two values. In the sample, the dimensions and their values
are: (1) letter type with values of A or J_; (2) letter size with values of
large or small; (3) border shape with values of circle or square; (4) border
texture with values of solid or dashed. Each pattern has one value from
each of the four dimensions. I have arbitrarily chosen one of the eight
values as correct. The idea is for you to figure out what this correct
value is. Look at each card and choose which side, left or right, contains
the correct value. I will then tell you whether your choice of sides was
correct or incorrect. In this way, you can eliminate the incorrect values
and determine the correct value in a few trials. The object is to figure
out what the correct value is so that you can choose the correct side as
Ill
often as possible. At the end of a series of trials, I'll ask you to tell
me the correct value. As you remember, there are 16 cards per problem.
You will begin with Card #1, and choose a side - left or right - and then
I will tell you whether you are correct or incorrect, depending on whether
or not the value I have chosen is on the side you select. Remember - the
correct answer will never be a combination of values. The correct answer
will be only one of the eight values - either circle or square - large or
small - A or T_ - solid or dashed. Do you have any questions? Are the
instructions clear?
Hints : The correct answer is one of the two shapes, either the square or
the circle. From your last response (left or right) do you see which
is the correct value? Now, let's go back to the beginning of Problem
#1, Card #1. We will begin this problem fresh. I will be selecting
a different value, and we will start this problem from scratch.
Second training problem : I have been saying "correct" or "incorrect" each
time you selected either the right side or the left side. From now
on I will not always tell you if you are correct or incorrect.
After some cards I will say nothing. Don't let this bother you.
Keep trying to be correct all of the time. Remember, you are still
trying to figure out which of the dimension's values is the correct
answer for this whole deck of cards.
Hints : If appropriate.
Soluble test problems : For the following problems I will be giving you
feedback after every fourth trial or in other words after ever;/
fourth card. After the other cards, I will say nothing. Again,
don't let this bother you. Keep trying to be correct for each of
the cards all of the time. Remember, you are still trying to figure
out which of the values is the correct answer for this whole series
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of cards. Any questions?
Insoluble test problems : The following problems, which are contained in
the other booklet, are similar to the problems you have been just
working on. Go ahead and open the other booklet to the first set
of stimulus patterns. The difference in these problems is that they
now contain an additional dimension of color, either blue or red.
So these problems now have five dimensions and ten values for you
to choose from: (1) letter type with values of A or J_; (2) letter
size with values of large or small; (3) border shape with values of
circle or square; (4) border texture with values of solid or dashed;
and (5) letter color with values of blue or red. In addition, since
I have included this extra dimension, you will have four more trials
or cards to help you solve the problem. The feedback trials are the
same - they will be given after every fourth trial or card. Also,
remember to say the number of the card you are on when responding.
Let me remind you - please remember to verbalize - think out loud -
whatever comes into you head - when you are working on these problems. It
is important to the success of this experiment for me to know what you are
thinking about while working on these problems.
Salience Condition : In addition to working on the problems, I want you to
keep a record of how well you are doing on these problems. On this
tally sheet, you will notice that there are eight problems. For each
problem there are a series of lines that correspond to two columns
,
either CORRECT or INCORRECT. Each time I tell you that you are
CORRECT or INCORRECT, I want you to put a checkmark in the correspond-
ing column. Also, at the end of each column, for each series of
problems, you will notice the words RIGHT or WRONG. After completing
each problem, I want you to circle the word RIGHT or WRONG that
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corresponds to whether I tell you that you are right or wrong in
your choice of values. The numbers alongside the lines in the
columns correspond to the cards where you will receive the feedback.
Be sure to pay special attention to the feedback that I give you
while working on these problems. This should help you do well on
all the problems.
Instructions to all groups :
Remembe- to verbalize whatever you may be thinking about while working
on these problems. I am very interested in your speech style as well as
tonal qualities of your voice - but especially, I am interested in the many
different things that college-age people think about while working on these
types of problem-solving tasks.
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APPENDIX E
Salience Manipulation Tally Sheet
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APPENDIX F
Interrater Reliability Coefficients for
Verbalization Categories
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Appendix F, Table 1
Interrater Reliability Correlation Coefficients
for Verbalization Categories
Soluble (Success) Insoluble (Failure)
Test Problems Test Problems
Statements of useful-task strategy .956
Statements of ineffectual approach to task .937
Ability attribution .950
Chance attribution 1.000
Effort attribution .899
Task difficulty attribution .919
Experimenter attribution .805
Self-instructions .912
Self-monitoring .899
Statements of positive affect .953
Statements of negative affect .949
Positive prognostic statements .952
Solution-irrelevant statements .990
.966
.978
.989
.965
1.000
.910
.898
.930
.902
.971
.953
.964
.953
X = .932 X = .952
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients
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APPENDIX G
Post-Experimental Questionnaire
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NAME:
SOCIAL SECURITY SUMBESL:
3LAS3
:
AGE: 3ES: Male
resale
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Li J i 5 3
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Please respond co the fallowing questions in tarns of how you £elc during the
concept formation casics that utilized five—alnecsicns .
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APPENDIX H
Attribution Questionnaire
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In regards co your performance on ehe concent :oraa:ica tasits, I wane you to ;o«
assign percentage estiaatas of responsibility for the outcoae an the ta3ks to
each of the foHaving:
fYour answers here aooly to che four—diner.sion. 15 trial orobiens;
Your own ability
Chance
Your own aifor:
Task difficulty
The axnerinenrsr
per cent (Z)
per cent (Z)
per can: (Z)
per cant (Z)
per can: (Z)
(your coca! should equal ICC")
r
"Your answers r.are anolv to the f ive-dinension. :riai orobiens')
Your own ability
Chance
Your own effort
Task difficulty
The axoeriaenter
per cent (Z)
per cane (")
per cane (Z)
per tan: ("I
per cent (")
(your total should acual LOOt)
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APPENDIX I
Statistical Analyses
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Appendix I, Table 1
Analysis of Variance of Hypothesis Checking Strategy Use
on Two Soluble (Success) Test Problems:
Type A-B x High-Moderate Salience Classification
Source Mean Square df F-Test P(F)
Type (T) 1.225 1 3.366 0.078
Salience (S) 0.625 1 1.718 0.198
T x S 3.025 1 8.313 0.007
Error (between) 0.364 36 — —
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Appendix I, Table 2
Analysis of Variance (Two Between, One Within)
on the Number of Times Each Subject Used Ineffectual or
Disconfirmed Hypotheses on the Four Insoluble (Failure) Test Problems:
Type A-B x High-Moderate Salience Classification
Source Error Term Mean Square df F-Test
Salience (S) N(ST) 2.7562 1 4.8940*
Type (T) N(ST) 1.4062 1 2.4969
Problems (P) PN(ST) 1.1062 3 2.9556*
S x T N(ST) 2.5562 1 8.0901**
S x P PN(ST) 0.2395 3 0.6401
P x T PN(ST) C.6562 3 1.7533
S x T x E PN(ST) 0.1062 3 0.2839
N(ST) — 0.5631 36 —
PN(ST) — 0.3742 108 —
* p < .05
** p < .01
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Appendix I, Table 3
Analysis of Variance on Subject's Degree of Deterioration
on Hypothesis Testing Strategy Use:
Type A-B x High-Moderate Salience Classification
Source Mean Square df F-Test P(F)
Type (T) 0.025 1 0.143 0.708
Salience (S) 0.625 1 3.571 0.067
T x S 3.025 1 17.286 0.0001
Error (between) 0.175 36 — —
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Appendix I, Table 5
Analysis of Variance for Self-rating of Post-experimental
Questionnaire Item "Was a Solution?":
Type A-B x High-Moderate Salience Classification
Source Mean Square df F-Test P(F)
Type (T) 2.500 1 4.286 0.046
Salience (S) 0.100 1 0.171 0.681
T x S 0.400 1 0.686 0.413
Error (between) 0.583 36 0.583
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APPENDIX J
Verbalization Category Rating Sheet
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ABSTRACT
This study investigated the differences between Type A and Type B
students in their performance on a cognitive task before and during failure.
The study further explored the nature of the experiences Type A and B
subjects perceive before and during exposure to noncontingency resulting
in failure. The Type A coronary-prone behavior pattern has been con-
ceptualized as a response style aimed at asserting and maintaining control
over one's physical and social environment. Past research has indicated
that Type A's, compared to Type B's, greatly increase their initial efforts
to assert control when confronted by potentially salient uncontrollable
events. As nonreinforced responding continues, Type A's exposed to highly
salient uncontrollable events, are also more likely to conclude that responding
is futile and that they are in fact helpless. Helplessness has been shown
to have deleterious effects on subsequent intellectual performance and, in
extreme cases, physical health.
The present research was aimed at (a) determining the nature, timing,
and relative frequency of a variety of cognitive variables by continuously
monitoring verbalizations before and during failure and (b) specifying the
precise nature of the performance change by examining the course of hypothesis-
testing strategies during failure. Typa A and B subjects were assigned to
one of two conditions: (1) Moderate Salience; and (2) High Salience. In
order to examine performance change under failure and the accompanying
cognitive components, subjects were trained on a discrimination learning
task that allowed monitoring of their hypothesis-testing strategies and
classification of the sophistication of the strategies before and during
failure. Subjects were requested to verbalize "what they are thinking about"
while performing the task. In contrast to the usual procedure of soliciting
statements of particular cognitions at prespecified times and of presupposed
structure, this continuous verbalization procedure permitted subjects to
report what congitions were salient to them as they became salient.
The results were consistent with previous research in that marked
performance differences were observed between Type A and B subjects, dependent
upon the salience classification: High Salience A's began to use more
ineffective and less sophisticated strategies during the failure experience
and to a lesser extent, so did Moderate Salience B's. When the cognitive
concomitants of the performance changes were examined, certain distinctions
were observed between High Salience A's and Moderate Salience B's. The
High Salience A's attributed their failure on the tasks to internal causes
(i.e., ability). Moderate Salience B's, on the other hand, tended to
attribute failure on the tasks to external causes (i.e., task difficulty).
The self-report attribution data, collected at the close of the experiment,
suggested that the Type A and B subjects actually encoded their attributions
to internal and external causes, respectively. The behavioral, cognitive and
self-report measures reflected a consistency of the data. These results
suggest that Type A's in the high salience condition were beginning to
experience personal helplessness and may continue to do so if, in fact, the
expectations of uncontrollability were generalized to a new situation.
Conversely, Moderate Salience B's appeared to be "pseudohelpless", that is,
they were experiencing universal helplessness
.
Helplessness has been suggested as a precursor of coronary heart
disease. This association between helplessness and coronary heart disease
underscores the importance of understanding the factors potentiating the
greater susceptibility of Type A's to the effects of uncontrollability.
The present results suggested that attributions and attentional differences
mediate the relationship between Pattern A, helplessness , and coronary
heart disease. Implications and speculations for the design of therapies
and intervention techniques for coronary-prone (i.e., Type A) individuals
were also discussed.


